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ABSTRACT 
The Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) of an aircraft carrier is one of the 
most important milestones in a carrier’s lifecycle. An RCOH supports the future 
modernization efforts that will sustain the carrier and extend its nuclear fuel lifetime an 
additional twenty-five years. To date, only two Nimitz class carrier overhauls have been 
completed, with a third in progress. Although these RCOHs were viewed as overall 
successes, they were unsuccessful from a risk management perspective because 
ultimately resulted in consecutive delivery delay and increased cost. This research 
assessed three (3) possible risk mitigation strategies for achieving cost and time 
effectiveness of a Nimitz class nuclear powered aircraft carrier (CVN) in dry-dock during 
the execution phase of an RCOH. The strategies evaluated were (1) to maintain the 
current RCOH process, (2) reduce and defer non-nuclear maintenance coupled with 
schedule compression, and (3) increase the efficiency of power usage of carriers with the 
intent of eliminating the need for refuelings. The results of this research indicate that 
eliminating a carrier’s RCOH increases its overall cost and time effectiveness. It also 
reveals that a 33-year carrier lifecycle, as opposed to a 50-year lifecycle, increases the 
ship’s operational availability and modernization capability.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This research addressed the complexity associated with refueling and complex 
overhauls (RCOH)s. An RCOH is comprised of three contractual phases that include 
planning, execution, and a post selective availability. This thesis specifically examines 
the Navy’s ongoing challenge of increasing the cost and time effectiveness of Nimitz-
class aircraft carriers in dry-dock during the execution phase of an RCOH. Cost 
effectiveness was defined by this research as the best tangible outcome compared to the 
total cost expended. It was also broadly defined as the following. 
• less cost for the more performance (work accomplished) 
• less cost for the same performance 
• less cost for less performance 
• same cost for more performance 
Time effectiveness (TE) was defined as any modification(s) in planning 
scheduling and/or conducting an overhaul that resulted in an RCOH schedule duration of 
less than or equal to 33 months. It was also broadly defined as the following. 
• less time for the more performance (work accomplished)  
• less time for the same performance 
• less time for less performance 
• same time for more performance 
The research methodology used was basic risk management within the structure 
of the systems engineering process. Risk management is an iterative process of 
identifying and measuring unknowns, developing mitigation strategies, selecting, 
planning and implementing appropriate risk mitigations, and tracking the implementation 
to ensure successful risk reduction. 
This research showed the importance of assessing the current process of planning 
and executing RCOHs to provide insights that addressed the notion of increasing cost and 
time effectiveness. 
Chapter I described the origin and importance of a carrier RCOH. Chapter II 
defined risk, its key terms, descriptions, and principles. Chapter III utilized a stakeholder 
 xvi
analysis and a high-level functional (physical) decomposition of “Conduct RCOH” to 
discover the two main objectives of (1) reducing the time in lay-up and (2) increasing 
cost effectiveness. Chapter IV described the processes of an RCOH within the context of 
these two main objectives. Potential risks were evaluated through the standard assessment 
of likelihood, consequences, and impact on cost, schedule, and performance. Chapter IV 
concluded with a risk matrix and three mitigation strategies that evaluated cost and time 
effectiveness. The first strategy was to assume the current process of planning and 
conducting RCOHs was the most efficient method because it leveraged the lessons 
learned from each previous overhaul. The second strategy was to control and transfer the 
consequence of excessive cost growth and schedule delay by reducing and deferring 
certain types of work typically performed during an RCOH while concurrently applying 
schedule compression techniques. In this option, mainly critical path (nuclear propulsion) 
maintenance would be performed during an overhaul. The third strategy was to avoid the 
consequence of excessive cost growth and schedule delay by increasing the power 
efficiency of carrier’s nuclear reactors with the goal of eliminating refuelings. 
Chapter V discussed four primary types of maintenance performed during an 
RCOH and assessed the three mitigation strategies derived at the end of Chapter IV.  The 
planning and execution of an RCOH was discussed in detail as well as the implications 
associated with maintaining the current process. Chapter V then discussed the impacts of 
reducing the scope of work in the availability work package (AWP) while compressing 
the overall schedule. Since work was not usually removed from the nuclear work package 
during previous RCOHs, the research suggested removing a reasonable amount of non-
nuclear maintenance from the AWP. Also, the recent advancements in reactor 
technologies and the possibility for more power efficient carriers was discussed. An 
analysis of alternatives (AoA) was provided to illustrate graphically the differences in the 
strategies. Lastly, a solution was determined. 
Chapter VI was a comparative analysis of the three mitigation strategies followed 
by the solutions suggested by the research. Trade-offs between the solutions were 
discussed and the author’s findings, recommendations, conclusions, and questions for 
future work were presented. 
 xvii
Finally, through basic systems engineering and risk management techniques, 
multiple solutions for addressing the ongoing challenges associated carrier RCOHs were 
shown to be available. This research demonstrated that it was more effective in cost and 
time to discontinue performing RCOHs and to adapt a 33-year carrier lifecycle strategy 
that in 100 years would save the Navy approximately $53.32 billion.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis was to provide alternate solutions for performing the 
execution phase of a refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) that increase its cost and 
time effectiveness. The goal of this research is to assess the impacts to an RCOH by 
reducing the risk associated with its planning, scheduling, and execution. 
The main thrust of this study was to evaluate the relationship between the two 
parameters of cost and time as they relate to an RCOH. This research then investigated 
three strategies for cost and time effectiveness as they pertained to the current challenge 
of aircraft carrier excessive cost growth and delivery delay during an RCOH.  
B.  BACKGROUND 
The Norfolk Naval Shipyard is the oldest naval shipyard in America. Established 
in 1767, and initially known as the Gosport Navy Yard, it housed the first dry dock in the 
western hemisphere. A dry dock is a basin or vessel whose volume is slightly larger than 
the dimensions of an incoming ship, allowing water to be added and removed from 
around a ship so work crews can gain access to the hull for purposes of construction, 
maintenance, repair, and access to/from waterways. With Congress’s requirements for a 
larger, faster, and more powerful Naval fleet during the War of 1812, the country’s first 
graving dry dock was constructed at Gosport in 1833. Shown in Figure 1, a graving dry 
dock is a dry dock that is excavated into the ground. Its walls are lined with concrete and 
separated from a main body of water by a watertight gate called a caisson. Utilizing this 
dry dock and others like it, the Navy and industry created an experienced workforce and 




Figure 1.   Graving Dry Dock (From: [2]) 
In 1920, using the ship construction technology of the previous era, the Navy 
conducted an experiment to convert the USS JUPITER (Collier 3) into a more versatile 
and technologically innovative war fighting vessel. The conversion was completed in 
1922, and the USS LANGLEY (previously USS JUPITER) was commissioned as the 
Navy’s first conventional aircraft carrier (CV-1) [3], [4] shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2.   USS Langley (CV-1) (From: [5]) 
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In an effort to create more powerful, faster, and self-sustaining aircraft carriers, 
the Navy began to incorporate nuclear propulsion into the carrier platform designs. The 
USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65), shown in Figure 3, became the world's first nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier in 1960 [6]. From this design, the USS NIMITZ (CVN 68), a 
supercarrier, was created and functioned as the template for all future nuclear powered 
carriers. Nimitz class carriers are designated as supercarriers due to their sheer size. They 
can characteristically displace up to 102,000 tons when fully loaded [7]. At the end of 
World War II, the United States Navy emerged as the premier naval fighting force in the 
world; however, the end of the Cold War resulted in a steady decline in naval fleet forces. 
Due to the reduced amount of carriers in service and their high operational tempo, 
carriers are required to refuel their nuclear reactors periodically in addition to 
accomplishing maintenance, repairs, and modernization alterations. These maintenance 
periods are called refueling and complex overhauls (RCOH).  
 
 
Figure 3.   USS Enterprise Underway (From: [7]) 
The RCOH of an aircraft carrier is one of the most important milestones in a 
carrier’s lifecycle because it supports the future modernization efforts that will sustain the 
carrier until the end of its planned 50-year service life. An RCOH occurs approximately 
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around the midlife of the carrier. It is one of the most challenging industrial and 
engineering undertakings by the Navy due to the massive amount of planning, budgeting, 
and management that must occur. At its midlife, an aircraft carrier is scheduled to 
undergo a 33-month maintenance period to refuel its nuclear reactors, upgrade and 
modernize combat and communication systems, and overhaul the ship's hull, mechanical 
and electrical systems. Upon redelivery, the carrier is fueled for its remaining lifecycle 
service [8].  
The ENTERPRISE was the first conventional aircraft carrier to conduct an RCOH 
in 1964. Although she completed four overhauls, the refueling of a nuclear powered 
supercarrier did not occur until 1998 with the USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) [9]. The second 
Nimitz-class carrier to conduct an RCOH was the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
(CVN 69) which completed her overhaul in March 2005 [10], and lastly, the USS CARL 
VINSON (CVN 70) commenced her RCOH late in 2005 [11]. In total, two completed 
RCOHs serve as cost and schedule analysis blueprints. 
Although these RCOHs were considered successes overall, via this research, the 
author believes the RCOH process should have been considered unsuccessful because it 
ultimately resulted in consecutive delivery delays and cost increases for the government.  
For example, the scheduled completion of the RCOH for the USS NIMITZ 
(Figure 4) slipped by several months and resulted in significant cost growth.  The primary 
causes were due to a fluctuating budget, changing work-requirements, and a four-month 
labor-union strike. The non-nuclear portion of the schedule slipped by several months 
and the contract increased 20% over the negotiated price (2.2 billion dollars). The initial 
awarded contract was for 33 months at 1.2 billion dollars [9, pp. 2, 34]. There should be a 




Figure 4.   USS Nimitz in Drydock (From: [12]) 
The USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69) as shown in Figure 5 was 
redelivered after a four-year scheduled downtime, costing approximately $3.18 billion. 
The initial award contract was for 36 months at $1.36 billion [13], [10], [14].  
 
Figure 5.   USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in Drydock (From: [15]) 
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Northrop Grumman was awarded a $1.94 billion cost-plus-incentive-fee contract 
for accomplishment of the fiscal year 2006 RCOH of the USS CARL VINSON (CVN 
70) shown in Figure 6. The United States Department of Defense comptroller's “Program 
Acquisition Costs by Weapon System” document lists split-funding for the CVN 70 
RCOH over FY2006-2007, with a total cost of $3.12 billion extended over 33 months of 
maintenance [11], [13].  
 
 
Figure 6.   USS Carl Vinson in Drydock (From: [16]) 
It is imperative for the Navy that carriers enter and exit dry dock in an expeditious 
manner to reduce the overall planning, management, and production costs associated with 
an RCOH. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question described in this section is developed to focus the thesis 
and to shape the research and subsequent analysis of data and information collected. It 
corresponds with the subjects of Chapters II, III, IV, V, and VI, respectively. The 
methodology presented in Section F was used to address the research question. The 
results and conclusions of the research question and of the thesis premise are summarized 
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in Chapter VI. By reducing risk, how can the Navy decrease the time in lay-up and 
increase the cost effectiveness of a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier in dry dock during the 
execution phase of an RCOH? 
D.  SCOPE 
This research was scoped to include the direct risks associated with planning, 
scheduling, and executing an RCOH.  
E.  BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The major benefit of this study is that it provided three strategies that assessed the 
notion of increasing cost and time effectiveness of a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier in dry 
dock during the execution phase of an RCOH. 
F.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used to develop this thesis was to apply basic risk management 
within the structure of systems engineering analysis. Below is the general thesis 




Figure 7.   Generic Engineering Analysis Process (After: [17, p. 112]) 
1. Define Problem Statement and Stakeholders for Thesis Coordination  
The problem statement addressed by this thesis is stated as: How can the Navy 
conduct RCOHs that are more cost and time effective? With an economy in recovery and 
the current administration’s necessary scrutiny of military programs, it is imperative that 
the Navy determine a solution or solutions to stem the growing costs of overhauls by 
minimizing the impact on production cost, schedule, and performance. Organizations 
with which this thesis has been coordinated are as follows. 
• Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
• Supervisor of Shipbuilding Newport News Virginia (SUPSHIP NN) 
• Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) 
2. Analysis Approach   
The approach used to analyze and evaluate this research was both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis within the structure of risk management. Risk management is an 
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iterative process of identifying and measuring unknowns, developing mitigation 
strategies, selecting, planning and implementing appropriate risk mitigations, and 
tracking the implementation to ensure successful risk reduction. 
a. Develop Essential Element of Analysis (EEAs) and Constraints 
The EEA of this thesis is the research question and the constraints are the 
time and information accessibility. 
b.  Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
The MOE of this research are cost effectiveness and time effectiveness of 
an RCOH. Cost effectiveness (Ceff) relates to the measure of a system in terms of mission 
fulfillment and total lifecycle cost, and can be expressed in various ways, depending on 
the specific mission or system parameters evaluated [17, p. 437]. The equation below 
defines cost effectiveness or cost figure of merit (CFOM) as the availability of an aircraft 
carrier divided by its lifecycle cost.  
  ( ) availabilityCost Figure of merit CFOM
lifecycle cost
− − =  [17, p. 437] 
Availability is presented as the figure-of-merit that assigns to each ship 
system the probability that the overall performance for the ship system will not be in 
failure mode when any user requires a demand to use the ship system in a manner typical 
of “normal” or “acceptable” operations. Availability is defined as the probability that the 
system will not be in a failed state or failing when service is required. Availability 
accounts for reliability and maintainability.  
Lifecycle cost is presented as the figure-of-merit that assigns to each ship 
system the probability that the overall performance for the ship system will not be after 
its end-of-life. The lifecycle cost figure-of-merit includes acquisition, installation, design, 
development, operations, maintenance, support, and disposal. Lifecycle is defined as the 
probability that the system has not been disposed of. 
Cost effectiveness is the ratio of the availability figure-of-merit divided by 
the lifecycle cost figure-of-merit. It is a number between 0 and 1 or 0% and 100%.  
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 i
U ptim e U ptim eA
U ptim e D ow ntim e L ifecycle tim e
= =+  
Analogously, 
[17, pp. 435-436]
( ) ( )i
i
M TB FA
M T BF M TTR Schedule D ow ntim e
M TBF  = M eantim e betw een fa ilures
M TTR = M eantim e to repair
A = Inherent availability (chosen because standby
       and  delay tim es associated  w ith 
= + +
scheduled  
       dow ntim es are not included)
 
If the scheduled downtime is both periodic and predictable, then after 
time, t, there is a scheduled downtime of tα . The percentage of time that the ship is not 
in maintenance is given by 1or  [18]
(1 )
t
t tα α+ + . Therefore, the scheduled downtime 
increases the lifecycle time by (1+α ), so that . 
(1 )( )i
M TBFA
M TB F M TTRα= + +  This 
model of iA  assumes independence between failure rates, repair times, and time to repair. 
To improve the precision of the availability model, one must include operating time, 
standby time, schedule and unscheduled maintenance times, time to wait for supply parts, 
processing times and other delays [19]. Using the same form as used for iA , these 
additional delays can be accounted for in the same manner by simply including them in 




M TBM M D T
M TBM = M eantim e betw een m aintenance
M D T = M ean dow ntim e
α= + +
. [17, p. 436] 
 11
Cost effectiveness of an RCOH (designated as effC ) can be defined as the 
total cost of an RCOH divided by the lifecycle cost of a carrier or the total cost of an 
RCOH divided by the service life expectancy of an aircraft carrier [20].  




Planning  + Execution + Post Selective Availabiltycost of  RCOH C







This research also defines effC  as any change in planning scheduling 
and/or conducting an RCOH that result in the following (Figure 8). 
• less cost for the more performance  
• less cost for the same amount of performance  
• less cost for less performance  
same cost for more performance  
COST EFFECTIVENESS 
< Cost > Performance 
< Cost = Performance 
< Cost < Performance 
= Cost > Performance 
= Cost = Performance 
> Cost = Performance 
> Cost < Performance 
= Cost < Performance 
Figure 8.   Cost Effectiveness 
Highlighted in red in Figure 8 is cost ineffectiveness ( ineffC ), which is 
defined as any change in planning, scheduling, and/or conducting an RCOH that results 
in the following. 
• more cost for the same amount of performance  
• more cost for the less performance  
• same cost for less performance  
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The baseline for effC  is the same cost for the same amount of performance 
as a previous RCOH (highlighted in sky blue in Figure 8). Performance is measured as 
the amount of work accomplished during an RCOH; however, it could be assessed as the 
accomplishment of a system’s functions as specified by that system’s requirements. In 
this case, deviations from performance requirements result in losses. This research 
assumed the baseline cost of the execution phase of an RCOH to be approximately $1.9 
billion. This figure was based on the current (actual) cost of the CVN 70’s overhaul and 
the assumption that the program office implemented the lessons learned, earned value 
management techniques, and cost savings strategies revealed at the CVN 68 and CVN 69 
“hot-washes” (meeting that discusses a project’s overall successes, failures, and lessons 
learned during an RCOH).   
Time effectiveness ( effT ) is defined as any change in planning scheduling 
and/or conducting an overhaul that results in a scheduled duration of equal to or less than 
33 months [21]. For example, the CVN 68 RCOH was completed after approximately 37 
months while the CVN 69 RCOH was completed after 48 months [9, pp. 1, 2, 97], [10]. 
Therefore, both of these RCOHs are considered time ineffective because their ratios are 





actual CVN 68 (Months)actual RCOH duration =
planned RCOH duration planned CVN 68 (Months)






actual CVN 69 (Months)actual RCOH duration =
planned RCOH duration planned CVN 69 (Months)
≈ = 1.45 
Shown in Figure 9, effT  is further defined and used by this research as any 
change in planning, scheduling and/or conducting an RCOH that result in the following. 
• less time for the more performance  
• less time for the same amount of performance  
• less time for less performance 




< Time > Performance 
< Time = Performance 
< Time < Performance 
= Time > Performance 
= Time = Performance 
> Time = Performance 
> Time < Performance 
= Time < Performance 
 
Figure 9.   Time Effectiveness 
Highlighted in red in Figure 9 is time ineffectiveness ( ineffT ), which is 
defined as any modifications in planning, scheduling, and/or conducting an RCOH that 
result in the following. 
• more time for the same amount of performance 
• more time for the less performance 
• more time for less performance  
The baseline for effT  is highlighted in sky blue in Figure 9. As stated 
previously, performance is measured as the amount of work accomplished during an 
RCOH or as the accomplishment of a system’s functions as specified by that system’s 
requirements. This research assumed the baseline duration of an RCOH to be 33 months. 
The 33-month schedule duration is based on the Navy’s desire to have a carrier asset 
operationally unavailable for the least amount of time possible, while supplying enough 
reasonable time to accomplish the necessary maintenance repairs, modifications and 
upgrades to sustain the ship throughout its remaining service life.   
c.  Identify Premise or Feasibility Alternatives 
The analysis conducted in this thesis centered on identifying three feasible 
alternatives to the problem statement. 
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• The first strategy is to assume the risk of excessive cost growth and 
schedule delay by maintaining the current process. 
• The second strategy is to control and transfer the risk of excessive cost 
growth and schedule delay through work redistribution, cancellation, and 
deferment.  
• The third strategy is to avoid the risk of excessive cost growth and 
schedule delay by increasing the power efficiency of carriers with the goal 
of eliminating the need for refuelings. 
d. Define Approach to Problem Resolution 
The general approach for problem resolution of this thesis was risk 
management within the scope of the systems engineering process. The research question 
was addressed through a comprehensive literature review, qualitative analysis, 
quantitative analysis, expert interviews, and personal experience (For two years, the 
author served as an Assistant Project Officer (APO) at the Supervisor of Shipbuiliding in 
Newport News, VA during the USS CARL VINSON’s RCOH. His primary 
responsibilities included Work Integration Leader, Customer Contracted Team Manager, 
and government oversight of the North Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding planning 
and execution contracts).  
This study began by discussing the origin and importance of a carrier 
RCOH. Risk was defined as well as its key terms, descriptions, and principles. A 
stakeholder analysis and high-level functional decomposition of “Conduct RCOH” was 
performed to reveal the main objectives of (1) reducing the time in layup and (2) 
increasing cost effectiveness. A process flow diagram of an RCOH was illustrated within 
the context of the two main objectives and potential risks were evaluated through the 
standard assessment of likelihood, consequences, and impact on cost, schedule, and 
performance. Then, a risk matrix and three mitigation strategies for time and cost 




The three mitigation strategies were evaluated through a comparative 
analysis and by using the cost and time effectiveness criteria defined above in Section 
F.2.b (page 9). An analysis of alternatives (AoA) was conducted to evaluate the solutions 
from various stakeholder perspectives and the author presented findings, 
recommendations, and questions relevant to future research. 
3. Evaluation Criteria 
a. Identify Data Needs 
This step determined the information and data needed to address the 
research questions. Publications discussed carrier overhauls, DoD policies and guidance, 
and reference models required for this thesis. Publications were read for existing research 
in the area of the EEAs, defined in this thesis to determine whether these questions had 
already been addressed.  
b. Identify Risks and Uncertainty 
There was no risk in completing this thesis due to cost issues, since 
funding was not required. There was minimal schedule risk since planning and 
preparation for completion began a year before the thesis was due. There was medium 
risk in the area of technical performance due to the uncertainty associated with attainting 
relevant desired data from subject matter experts within both government and industry.   
4. Evaluation Techniques 
The specific techniques used to address the thesis research question and to 
evaluate this premise were qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, general probability 
and statistics, and the software application Probability/Consequences Screening, version 
4.3.2, July 2006, developed by ASC/ENS, Wright-Patterson AFB Ohio. The overall 
techniques used included literature research and review, subject matter expert interviews 
and personal experience. No architecture products, mathematical models, or simulations 
were required to address the research questions. 
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5. Obtain, Construct and/or Verify and Validate Models 
Formal models were not constructed as a product of this thesis. 
6. Source Data Collection 
Information was gathered through the coordination of government officials within 
the ship building industry. The NPS Library was used to query the EBSCOhost, BOSUN, 
DTIC, and IEEE Xplore databases for professional journal articles, conference 
proceedings and DoD policies, directives, instructions, manuals, and guides in search of 
information and data pertaining to the research questions. 
The literature was initially scanned to determine whether the research questions 
had been previously addressed, or if the questions were otherwise easily answered by 
existing publications. This review revealed some relevant reference documents, but no 
comprehensive, consolidated documentation that addressed the research questions in the 
context of the thesis premise. 
The initial scan was followed by an in-depth literature review for pertinent 
information required to support the research questions. 
7. Evaluation of Alternatives 
The results of the research were evaluated and a determination was made on the 
validity of the premise, referencing supporting information, and data. 
8. Results and Recommendations 
Findings associated with the research question were discussed in the appropriate 
chapters and conclusions were drawn based on interpretation of the results in the context 
of the research questions. Recommendations were made for improvement of RCOH 
planning methodology. Conclusions were drawn regarding the validity of the thesis 
premise.  
After the results and recommendations were coordinated with NPS, SUPSHIP 
NN, and NGC, the final thesis was submitted to NPS for processing and public release. 
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9. Iterate and Refine the Analysis 
Feedback on the published thesis may generate more or expanded research 
questions. This thesis may be revisited for expansion or refocusing of the scope, in which 
case, all or part of the methodology could be repeated, making the necessary 
modifications. 
G.  SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an introduction and overview of this thesis, including the 
purpose, background, research question, scope, benefits, and methodology. 
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II. RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
A. RISK 
The methodology used to address the research question defined in Chapter I is 
risk management within the structure of the systems engineering process. Risk was 
defined as a measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and 
objectives within defined cost, schedule and performance constraints.  It can be 
associated with all aspects of a program as they relate across the Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS) and Integrated Master Schedule (IMS).  It addresses the potential 
variation in the planned approach and its expected outcome [22, p. 1]. It is further 
described by equation [2-1] below as the product of the likelihood and impact of a given 
event over a time horizon. 
*consequence event consequenceRISK LIKELIHOOD IMPACT
time time event
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (2-1) 
Risk is a qualitative measure determined through statistical analysis or subject 
matter expertise.  
B. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management is an iterative process accomplished throughout the lifecycle of 
a system. It is an organized and systematic methodology for continuously doing the 
following. 
• identifying and measuring unknowns 
• developing mitigation strategies 
• selecting, planning, and implementing appropriate risk mitigations 
• tracking the implementation to ensure successful risk reduction 
Effective risk management depends on risk management planning; early identification 
and analyses of unknowns; early implementation of corrective actions; continuous 
monitoring and reassessment; and communication, documentation, and coordination [22, 
p. 3]. 
 20
C.      RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS MODEL 
The risk management process model (Figure 10) includes the following key 
activities, performed on an iterative basis [22, p. 4]. 
• Risk Identification 
• Risk Analysis 
• Risk Mitigation Planning 
• Risk Mitigation Plan Implementation 














Figure 10.   DoD Risk Management Process (From: [22, p. 4]) 
D. RISK KEY ACTIVITIES 
Quantifying risk is the process of identifying all potential future uncertainties (i.e., 
likelihoods and consequences) associated with a particular program’s success or failure 
criteria. It also examines each element of a program to determine associated root causes 
[22, p. 7]. 
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Risk analysis is the process of using a systems framework to account for 
uncertainties in modeling, behavior, prediction models, interaction among components of 
a system, and impacts on the system and its surrounding environment [24]. The intent of 
risk analysis is to determine the severity of risk by the following. 
• considering the likelihood of the root cause occurrence 
• identifying the possible consequences in terms of performance, schedule, 
and cost 
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Figure 11.   Risk Reporting Matrix (From: [22, p. 11]) 
The Risk Reporting Matrix above is used to determine the level of risks identified 
within a program. The level of risk for each root cause is reported as low (green), 
moderate (yellow), or high (red). The level of likelihood of each root cause is established 
















Figure 12.   Levels of Likelihood Criteria (From: [22, p. 12]) 
The level and types of consequences of each risk are established utilizing criteria 














Technical Performance Schedule Cost 
1 
Minimal or no consequence to 
technical performance 
Minimal or no 
impact 
Minimal or no 
impact 
2 
Minor reduction in technical 
performance or supportability, can be 
tolerated with little or no impact on 
program 
Able to meet key 
dates. 
Slip <  *  
month(s)  
Budget 
increase or unit 
production cost 
increases. 
 <  **  (1% of  
Budget) 
3 
Moderate reduction in technical 
performance or supportability with 
limited impact on program objectives 
Minor schedule 
slip. Able to meet 
key milestones 
with no schedule 
float. 
Slip <  *  
month(s)  
Sub-system slip >  
*  month(s) plus 
available float. 
Budget 
increase or unit 
production cost 
increase 
 <  **  (5% of 
Budget) 
4 
Significant degradation in technical 
performance or major shortfall in 




Slip <  *  months 
Budget 
increase or unit 
production cost 
increase 
 <  **  (10% of 
Budget) 
5 
Severe degradation in technical 
performance; Cannot meet KPP or 
key technical/supportability 
threshold; will jeopardize program 
success 
Cannot meet key 
program 
milestones.  
Slip >  *  months 
Exceeds APB 
threshold 
 >  **  (10% of 
Budget)  
Table 1.   Levels and Types of Consequence Criteria (From: [22, p. 13]) 
The results for each risk are then plotted in the corresponding single square on the Risk 











Risk Mitigation Planning is a process of determining the proper action in 
addressing foreseen uncertainty. The intent of risk mitigation planning is to answer the 
question “What is the program approach for addressing this potential unfavorable 
consequence?”  Mitigation options include the following. 
• Avoiding risk by eliminating the root cause and/or the consequence 
• Controlling the cause or consequence 
• Transferring the risk, and/or 
• Assuming the level of risk and continuing on the current program plan 
Risk Mitigation Plan Implementation is the process of ensuring the execution of 
the appropriate prescribed mitigation strategy [22, p. 19]. 
• Determines what planning, budget, and requirements and contractual 
changes are needed 
• Provides a coordination vehicle with management and other stakeholders 
• Directs the teams to execute the defined and approved risk mitigation 
plans 
• Outlines the risk reporting requirements for on-going monitoring 
• Documents the change history 
Risk Tracking is the iterative process of monitoring and adjusting as necessary an 
implemented mitigation plan. Its intent is ensuring successful risk mitigation.  It answers 
the question “How are things going?” by the following. 
• Communicating risks to all affected stakeholders 
• Monitoring risk mitigation plans 
• Reviewing regular status updates 
• Displaying risk management dynamics by tracking risk status within an 
Risk Reporting Matrix 
• Alerting management when risk mitigation plans should be implemented 
or adjusted 
An event's likelihood and consequences may change as the acquisition process 
proceeds and updated information becomes available. Therefore, throughout a program, a 




program for new root causes. Successful risk management programs include timely, 
specific reporting procedures tied to effective communication among the program team 
[22, p. 20]. 
E. CHAPTE R SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the concept of risk, its management, key activities, and 
application as a systematic approach to the expeditious and thorough evaluation of 
complex systems or systems of systems under various operational or extreme conditions. 
Having established the purpose and context of risk management as a component 
of the systems engineering process, the next chapter presents an iterative system 
engineering approach beginning with a stakeholder analysis and functional 
decomposition of the main objective or goal, “Conduct RCOH.” 
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III. RCOH STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS AND FUNCTIONAL 
DECOMPOSITION  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter builds on the previous chapter by identifying significant graphical 
representations or entities of interest associated with an RCOH, as well as their impacts. 
For the sake of simplicity in describing an extremely complex evolution, this chapter will 
also illustrate a broad view analysis of how to organize and conduct an RCOH. Sections 
B and C define the terms stakeholder and stakeholder analysis. Section D demonstrates 
the risk management methodology in the structure of the systems engineering process by 
performing a functional decomposition of the goal “Conduct RCOH” to determine its 
primary functions. Section E describes seven major industrial components associated 
with an RCOH. Section F presents a process flow diagram and detailed description of 
how a RCOH is coordinated and conducted while Section G summarizes the chapter. 
B. STAKEHOLDE R 
A stakeholder is an organization, group, individual, or entity directly or indirectly 
affected by the advancement, stagnancy, success, failure, or cancellation of a particular 
program or system architecture. 
C. STAKEHOLDE R ANALYSIS 
Stakeholder analysis is the process of identifying specific organizations, 
businesses, communities, groups or individuals affected by the planning, funding, 
management, success, or failure of a particular project or event. The following entities 






Figure 13.   Stakeholder Analysis 
1. Major Stakeholders Defined 
a. President of the United States 
As Commander and Chief of the United States Military forces, the 
President is overall responsible for ensuring that the National Security Strategy 
adequately provides the appropriate resources allocation for naval forces to perform and 
continue their function of force projection, sustainability, and technological advancement 
as well as dominance of the maritime domain. 
b. Congress 
As stewards of American taxpayer’s resources, it is responsible for the 
legitimate appropriation and proper funding of all Department of Defense (DoD) 
approved programs.    
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c. Taxpayers 
The taxation of the American people’s income is a major source of the 
revenue controlled and distributed by Congress to fund all programs presented in the 
program objective memorandum (POM).  
d. Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) 
It is responsible for identifying and prioritizing acquisition category, 
ACAT ID, programs such as RCOHs. The DAE is also the milestone decision authority 
for such programs.  
e. Program Executive Office (PEO) 
The PEO, PMS 250 is overall responsible to Congress for the proper 
planning, budgeting, and solicitation of resources to accomplish an RCOH. The PEO 
executes all headquarters-level responsibilities for the acquisition and lifecycle 
management of aircraft carriers. For a Ship Construction, Navy (SCN)-funded program 
such as an RCOH, the PEO reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition. The PEO also reports to the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) through the NAVSEA Commander for matters pertaining to in-service support. 
Under the PEO, the Aircraft Carrier Program Office (PMS 312) executes all PEO 
responsibilities pertaining to aircraft carriers, including design, construction, and 
maintenance. Management authority, including budgeting for RCOHs, is delegated to the 
assistant program manager for RCOHs (PMS 312D). PMS 312D either performs 
internally or manages all aspects of the RCOH from initial budgeting and work planning 
to execution and follow-up lessons learned, except those responsibilities under the 
cognizance of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) [9, pp. 5, 6].  
f. Navy Nuclear Power Program (NNPP)  
The NNPP exercises its responsibilities through the Director of the NNPP, 
within the Office of the CNO, and through the Deputy Commander of NAVSEA for 
Nuclear Propulsion (O8) (responsible for the technical aspects of the propulsion plant). 
NAVSEA O8 has the overall program management responsibility, including 
 30
identification of budget needs for the nuclear work in the RCOH. The Deputy 
Administrator for Naval Reactors is responsible for reactor safety. The NNPP has their 
own staff of engineering and management personnel who manage their portion of the 
program. Some other key NNPP facilities that serve RCOHs include the following.  
• Knolls and Bettis Atomic Power (Two government-owned, contractor-
operated (GOCO) Department of Energy laboratories) 
• A GOCO procurement organization devoted to acquiring certain NNPP 
materials needed to conduct the RCOH 
• A specialized office within the Naval Supply Systems Command utilized 
for acquiring and supplying consumable materials needed for maintenance 
of NNPP hardware 
• A planning capability designated the Carrier Reactor-Plant Planning Yard 
(RPPY), operated by NGC, which performs much of the RCOH planning 
for nuclear work, including development of the nuclear work package, 
known as the carrier reactor-plant overhaul package (CARPOP) 
To implement its safety responsibilities, the NNPP maintains Department 
of Energy field offices (Naval Reactors Representative’s Office (NRRO)) at nuclear-
capable shipyards. At NGC, this office monitors work aboard the RCOH ship to ensure 
that it is conducted in a manner that assures the continued safe maintenance, repair, and 
subsequent operation of the ship’s reactor plants. The NNPP has access to all NAVSEA 
offices on matters that interface between nuclear and non-nuclear responsibilities. It also 
has access to NNS on technical issues, indirectly by way of PMS 312D and directly from 
its own technical staff. In regards to safety matters, it has access to the yard by way of the 
NRRO [9, pp. 6, 7]. 
g. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
NAVSEA is responsible for contract administration and day-to-day 
management of the RCOH’s execution phase via SUPSHIP NN. SUPSHIP NN, Code 
152, holds the primary responsibility of ensuring that the shipyard complies with the 
established contract and that issues are identified and resolved quickly. Other SUPSHIP 
NN offices provide services to the supervisor or to PMS 312D when tasked. These 
services include but are not limited to work planning, financial-report review, non- 
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nuclear engineering, design review, quality assurance, government furnished material 
procurement and management, and financial management. The Code 1800 group in 
SUPSHIP NN supervises the planning of the RCOHs [9, p. 8]. 
h. Program Manager (PM) 
The program manager or Sponsor, PMS 312D is directly responsible to 
PEO for the proper, oversight, schedule integration and adherence, resource management, 
and conflict resolution during the planning and execution phase of an RCOH.  
i. United States Navy (USN) 
The USN is the customer during an RCOH. It is responsible for ensuring 
that all carrier assets are available when necessary to support the National Security and 
Defense Strategy.  
j. Ship’s Force (SF) 
The SF or crew refers to the labor force, operators, and inhabitants of a 
carrier before and after a RCOH. They perform various functions during the RCOH, 
including but not limited to the following.   
• General watchstanding and oversight of the various compartments and 
spaces on the ship 
• Safety aspects of work, including closing of valves and circuit breakers 
(referred to as “tagouts”) 
• Ship security 
• Operation of shipboard equipment 
• Damage Control (immediate response to fire or flooding) 
• Training to support crew certification at delivery 
• Maintaining ship cleanliness 
• Logistics support, including records updating 
• Ship administration 
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The crew also is responsible for the administration and execution of the ship’s force work 
package (a set of tasks in the overall work package designated specifically for SF 
accomplishment). Some of these tasks include the repair of ship systems and the 
refurbishment of hundreds of onboard living spaces [9, p. 9]. 
k. Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) 
Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) is the Lead Maintenance Activity 
(LMA) during an RCOH. It is also the major epicenter of naval military industrial work 
in Newport News, Virginia. NGC’s role is to develop and implement the management 
tools required to establish, maintain, and disseminate an Integrated Master Schedule 
(IMS) and associated metrics or agendas during RCOH. It is the largest shipbuilder in the 
United States in terms of both facilities and employment and is the only U.S. shipyard 
with the capability to build and refuel nuclear aircraft carriers. Additionally, NGC is the 
planning yard for the nuclear portion of a RCOH [9, pp. 8, 9]. 
l. Customer Contracted Teams (CCT) 
A CCT is a military, government, or contracted activity uniquely trained 
to accomplish specialized alterations, installations or repairs outside the scope but under 
the cognizance of the prime contractor. 
m. Supervisor of Shipbuilding Newport News, Virginia (SUPSHIP 
NN) 
SUPSHIP NN, the Naval Supervising Authority (NSA), provides the 
government oversight and contractual management of NGC during the planning and 
execution phases of an RCOH. The NSA is the single naval activity responsible for work 
being accomplished on carriers during RCOHs. It is responsible for ensuring that planned 
work is authorized for accomplishment and that the LMA complies with the established 




n. Type Commander (TYCOM) 
The TYCOM has administrative control over an aircraft carrier and is 
responsible for a vast majority of lifecycle maintenance done on the ship outside of an 
RCOH. Additionally, it is responsible for ensuring that the ship deploys fully trained and 
prepared for her operational commitments [9, p. 10]. 
o. Elected Officials of Virginia 
These official are representatives (i.e., mayor, governor, senators) elected 
by the citizens of Virginia to ensure the economic stability, industrial growth, 
infrastructure development/enhancement, and proper policy needed to optimize the 
productivity and value of the providences under their purview.  
p. Opposition 
Opposition is a rival military entity or naval force responsible for 
generating countermeasures against a Carrier Strike Group (CSG). 
q. Environmentalists  
Environmentalists are individuals or organizations dedicated to the 
sustainable and responsible management of all earthly resources. They advocate the 
stewardship of the global ecosystem through legislation, political influence, or changes in 
corporate as well as individual behavior.  
r. Combatant Commanders (CCDR)s 
Combatant Commanders are high-ranking military officials responsible 
for the prudent deployment of appropriate and available military assets within a specific 
geographical region for particular mission functions.  
D. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
A functional decomposition is an iterative detailed analysis that reduces a 
complex system or system of systems down to its essential elements or core components. 
From these core components or functions, basic requirements can be generated to support 
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proposed system architecture. As illustrated in Figure 14, the six primary functions 
necessary to conduct an RCOH are to plan, communicate, budget, fund, execute, and 
manage the overhaul. Each primary function is decomposed further for a detailed 




Figure 14.   Top-level Functional Decomposition of “Conduct RCOH.” 
1. To Plan 
Shown in Figure 15, To Plan is the most critical function in an RCOH. It is the 
precursor to a successful overhaul because (if initiated efficiently) it provides a 
reasonably detailed, methodical, and systematic guide to appropriate scheduling, resource 
loading, and execution of maintenance. Planning involves teambuilding, understanding 
program constraints and limitations, defining all planned and unplanned maintenance to 
be conducted, work integration, and contract negotiations. There are alternative 
reductionist’s views of “To Plan.” While there are alternative reductionism's views of 
“To Plan,” by aligning the afore-listed functions under the higher-level function of ‘plan,’ 
the primary emphasis is placed on contracting, since the majority of government 
activities are service acquisition related. Team building is the process of establishing 
open communication, transparency, and stakeholder participation. Understanding 
program constraints requires conducting a risk analysis, forecasting future environmental 
impacts, and ensuring available technical expertise. Defining work is the process of 
understanding requirements, reviewing historical documentation, and consulting with 
subject matter experts. Integrating work involves receiving statements of work (SOW),  
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developing work breakdown structures (WBS) and generating an integrated master 
schedule (IMS). Finally, contract negotiations require submitting requests for proposals 
(RFP), proposal evaluations, and source selection.  
 
 
Figure 15.   Functional Decomposition of “Plan.” 
2. To Communicate 
Shown in Figure 16, To Communicate is the common denominator and essential 
capability connecting all functions. It is the process of delivering and organizing a 
message, transferring emotion as well as thought. Delivering a message involves a 
receiver, delivery media, and language. Organizing a message requires collecting, 
processing, and discarding any unnecessary data. Transferring emotion is the process of 
generating, processing, and releasing feelings. Lastly, transferring thought is 




Figure 16.   Functional Decomposition of Communicate. 
3. To Budget 
Shown in Figure 17, To Budget is providing appropriate monetary resources to 
ensure the overhauls’ sufficient planning, scheduling, and execution. It is the process of 
prioritizing maintenance needs, selecting work to be accomplished, determining 
maintenance providers, estimating total cost, negotiating contract costs, and requesting 
funds from Congress. Prioritizing maintenance needs involves reviewing proposed 
maintenance, determining essential mission capabilities, and reviewing historical data. 
Selecting work to be accomplished involves scoping work, determining required 
maintenance, and de-scoping work. Determining a maintenance provider is deciding 
whether NGC, CCT, SF or a combination of those groups will conduct ship repairs, 
modifications, or alterations. Cost Estimation entails conducting an independent cost 
estimate, a cost benefit analysis, and a program manager’s cost estimate to forecast the 




the contractor and government as to the appropriate total cost of the overhaul. Finally, 




Figure 17.   Functional Decomposition of Budget. 
4. To Fund 
Shown in Figure 18, To Fund is the action of monetarily compensating an entity 
for providing a service. It involves obtaining, appropriating, and distributing resources. 
Obtaining resources is accomplished by submitting a budget request for approval to 
Congress. Appropriating resources or apportionment is the process of Congress itemizing 
funds into specific accounts (colors of money) and authorizing it to the Program 
Managers Office (PMO). Paying the contractors refers to the government making a 
commitment, obligation, expenditure, and outlay to the contractor. Additionally, fees are 




Figure 18.   Functional Decomposition of Fund. 
5. To Execute 
Shown in Figure 19, To Execute is the process of government and contractor 
initiating authorized maintenance, repairs, alterations associated with the RCOH. It is 
instituted by a finalized authorized work package (AWP) and integrated master schedule 
(IMS), and by conducting scheduled maintenance. Preparing a finalized AWP involves 
the PMO formalizing the work to be completed during the RCOH. The IMS created and 
maintained by the contractor contains the work breakdown structures (WBS) of all 
entities authorized to complete maintenance during the overhaul. Finally, conducting 




Figure 19.   Functional Decomposition of Execute. 
6. To Manage 
Shown in Figure 20, To Manage is the process of handling or directing a system 
efficiently and appropriately towards achieving its main objectives while displaying some 
level of professional expertise. It involves leading, synchronizing, commanding and 
controlling an organization or group. Leadership requires organizing and performance. 
Synchronization includes motivation, training, and hiring appropriately. Commanding 
entails communicating expectations, managing resources, and establishing a hierarchy. 
Additionally, control refers to the responsibility of correcting discrepancies, monitoring 
performance, and setting up processes. 
 40
 
Figure 20.   Functional Decomposition of Manage. 
E. SEVEN INDUSTRIAL COMPONENTS OF AN RCOH 
According to Mr. Richard MacPherson, the SUPSHIP NN RCOH Planning 
Manager, an RCOH is comprised of seven different industrial components planned by the 
PMO to accomplish specific types of maintenance during the overhaul. As shown in 
Figure 21, the seven main industrial categories are Nuclear Propulsion, Topside, Non-
Nuclear Propulsion, Hull Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E), Combat Systems 
(CS/C4I), Customer Contracted Teams (CCT), and Emergent and Supplemental (E&S) 
maintenance. Figure 21 presents a broad overview of the major industrial components of 
an RCOH. It is a notional illustration of the general weights assigned to each RCOH 
component and is not to be viewed as an exact description since each aircraft carrier’s 
maintenance profile is unique.  
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Figure 21.   Refueling and Complex Overhaul Pie Chart  
Nuclear propulsion maintenance applies to all repairs, modifications, alterations 
or installations directly associated and specifically designated for the overhauling, 
repairing, and refueling of an aircraft carrier’s nuclear reactors. The major contributing 
factor to the successful completion of an RCOH and carrier delivery is the full 
accomplishment of its nuclear propulsion work package. Due to its mean time to refuel, 
material sensitivity, and classified nature, the nuclear propulsion work package 
constituents the critical path maintenance during an RCOH. All other maintenance efforts 
are integrated in a manner that minimally interferes with the successful completion the 
CARPOP. Also, the nuclear propulsion work package is the most militarily sensitive, 
costly, and heavily scrutinized segment of an RCOH.  
Topside maintenance refers to any repairs, modifications, or alterations conducted 
outside the propulsion plant, internal as well as external to the ship. This work 
encompasses collecting holding and transfer (CHT) piping, deck machinery, and 
auxiliary system repairs as well as flight deck catapult and arresting gear upgrades. Some 
topside work can also be classified as mission-essential. 
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Non-Nuclear propulsion maintenance consists of all repairs, modifications, 
alterations, or installations of equipment, systems or sub-systems associated with ship 
propulsion while free of nuclear components or interferences. Although propulsion 
related, this work is conducted outside the cognizance or scope of the Naval Reactors 
Office (NRO).  
Hull, Mechanical & Electrical (HM&E) maintenance refers to repairs, 
modifications, alterations and installations that support the solid mechanics, structural 
integrity, structural dynamics, computational mechanics, dynamics of electric power 
networks and control and distribution of electric power systems throughout the ship.  
Combat System maintenance mostly consists of modifications, alterations, 
installations, or upgrades of equipment, systems or sub-systems associated with 
command, control, communication, computing, and intelligence (C4I) components or 
modules that enable an aircraft carrier to lead in weapons systems, air operations, carrier 
air traffic control, strike operations, anti-submarine warfare, meteorology and 
oceanography technologies.  
Customer Contracted Team (CCT) maintenance refers to repairs, modifications, 
alterations or installations conducted by an entity other than the prime contractor. They 
often but not always possess a level of expertise or critical skill set that is absent in the 
primary contractor. CCTs are often utilized when they possess the same skill set as the 
prime contractor but at lower overall cost. Currently, CCT maintenance represents a 
small overall portion of an RCOH authorized work package (AWP) but due to ever-
present budget constraints, their workload and responsibilities are steadily increasing.  
E&S maintenance refers to all repairs, modifications, alterations or installations 
not initially planned for by the PMO during an overhaul but authorized by the sponsor 
through a contract modification for accomplishment during an RCOH.    
F.  PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM OF AN RCOH 
The planning, organizing, and execution of an RCOH is one of the most 
challenging industrial and engineering undertakings of the Navy because of the massive 
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man-hours dedicated to scheduling, integrating, budgeting, and managing assigned work. 
Due to the enormity of this evolution, it is beyond the scope of this research to define all 
aspects of the overhaul fully; however, it does provide key processes that must occur for 
an RCOH to proceed. Figure 22 illustrates a general sequence of events or key processes 
that must occur to conduct an RCOH beginning with Congressional authorization. 
 
Figure 22.   General Process Flow Diagram of an RCOH. 
Congress reviews the President’s Budget and the Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) to determine necessary fundable programs and their requirements. 
They then develop a cost estimate, apply appropriations and funding policies, budget 
using planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE), and appropriate through 
the enactment process. The enactment process involves legislation passing a budget 
resolution, authorization bill, and an appropriation bill. Afterwards, Congress provides 
budget authority to the Office of Management and Business (OMB), which apportions 
resources to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller. The OSD 
Comptroller then releases those resources to the Service Comptroller, who in turn,  
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allocates funds to the Major Command/Program Executive Officer for Aircraft Carriers 
(MAJCOM/PEO Carriers). PEO Carriers then sub-allocates resources to the PMO to 
execute an RCOH [25].  
Ship Conversion and Construction, New (SCN) pecuniary resources are 
appropriated and utilized during an RCOH. SCN funds have a programming lifecycle of 
five years and a maximum of five years for execution of funds by the project team 
(government and prime contractor) after being programmed. Once funding is secured, the 
project team begins negotiating a RCOH planning contract. The planning contract covers 
the expenses anticipated and required to begin the planning phase of an RCOH. After the 
project team reaches a contract agreement, the planning phase begins. The planning phase 
lasts three years and involves creating management strategies and guidelines, team 
building through integrated production teams (IPTs), allocating appropriate labor force to 
support planning efforts, developing an authorized work package (AWP) as well as a 
preliminary integrated master schedule (IMS).  
The AWP is a database that comprises the entire work breakdown structures of 
the seven major industrial components described in Section E. It accounts for all of the 
routine and anticipated nuclear propulsion, non-nuclear propulsion, topside, combat 
systems, hull mechanical and electrical, customer contract team, ship force and emergent 
and supplemental maintenance supported for accomplishment during the RCOH. As the 
AWP is compiled, work is continually added or removed to support the obligated budget, 
or imposed monetary or schedule constraints. While the AWP is being generated, the 
LMA (prime contractor) simultaneously develops an IMS, which details the work 
authorized for accomplishment, the duration of the tasks, and the entity/entities 
accountable for performing the work. Upon completing the development of the AWP and 
IMS, the RCOH execution contract is negotiated.   
The RCOH execution contract covers the anticipated expenses to be incurred 
during the execution phase of the overhaul. Upon an agreement reached by the 
government and prime contractor as to the terms and conditions set forth by the execution 
contract, physical labor begins. During this phase, all repairs, refurbishments, alterations, 
and installations are conducted in accordance with the AWP and IMS. One of the most 
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important evolutions during the execution phase is the separation of the ship into 
segments to support the removal, refurbishment, and replacement of the vessel’s nuclear 
reactor. Additionally, all authorized work is monitored, de-conflicted, progressed, and 
reported by the project team to ensure cost and schedule adherence. 
Upon completion of authorized maintenance tasks, the equipment, system, or sub-
system are tested and evaluated to ensure that they meet the appropriate performance 
parameters. After completing the test and evaluation (T&E) phase, the government either 
accepts or rejects the maintenance accomplished by the LMA. If the maintenance is 
accepted, the government resumes ownership of the tested equipment, system, or 
subsystem; however, if the maintenance is not accepted, the contractor will continue to 
repair or modify the equipment until the appropriate performance standards are met.    
Once the reactor is refueled, the ship reassembled, and the majority of 
maintenance completed, the carrier is removed from dry-dock and placed pier side. There 
it undergoes a post selective availability/selective restrictive availability (PSA/SRA) in 
which work that could not be accomplished during the RCOH is completed. The 
PSA/SRA differs from the RCOH in the scope of work planned for accomplishment and 
by the funding source. The PSA is funded with SCN dollars while the SRA is funded 
with operational maintenance, Navy (OM&N) resources. Additionally, the Type 
Commander, Commander Naval Air Force (COMNAVAIR/LANT) instead of the 
Program Executive Officer for Carriers (PMS 312D) is the sponsor.  
G. CHAPTE R SUMMARY 
This chapter began by describing the key players involved in an RCOH and how 
they either affect or are impacted by the overhaul. It then proceeded to decompose 
functionally the goal of conducting an RCOH into six primary functions: to plan, to 
communicate, to budget, to fund, to execute, and to manage. The six primary functions 
were further analyzed to provide a broad overview of what an RCOH required. From the 
“to plan” function, seven major industrial components were determined that characterized 
the planning phase of the RCOH. It was revealed that these major industrial complexes 
determined the type and scope of work accomplished during the overhaul. A process flow 
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diagram was then presented that illustrated the sequence of events necessary to 
coordinate and institute an RCOH effort starting with Congressional authorization to the 
aircraft carrier’s redelivery to the Navy.  
Having established the various entities involved in an RCOH, its (RCOH) primary 
functions, major industrial components, and sequence of events, the next chapter presents 
an iterative risk analysis within the structure of the systems engineering process. 
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IV.  RISK ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the most common risks associated with an RCOH 
beginning by defining the terms risk (Section B), risk identification (Section C) and root 
causes (Section D). It then determines the possible risks (Section E) associated with the 
primary functions (Chapter III) of conducting an RCOH. Using the risk likelihood table 
provided in Chapter II, it performs a risk analysis (Section F) by assigning weights (i.e., 
degrees of likelihood and severity) to each risk. Section G uses the software application 
program Probability/Consequences and Schedule to construct a risk matrix from which 
are exposed the most urgent risks anticipated to (1) negatively impact each primary 
function of an RCOH as well as (2) the overhaul in the totality of functions. Section H 
concludes with a summary of the chapter.   
B.  RISK DEFINED 
“Risk is the unknowable seemingly captured through logic and reason.  It is the 
likelihood of occurrence convolved with the commensurate consequence of that 
occurrence. Risk is therefore both subjective and quantifiable. It is subjectivity by our 
inability to determine full causality of future events [26].” According to Professor Gary 
Langford, Systems Engineering Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, risk is 
quantifiable by one’s determination to understand the set of initial conditions, the 
problem, and the solution, that is through a theory of consequences. Simple risk is the 
multiplication of two quantities, the consequence of the performance of a function and 
the likelihood of that consequence occurring. The consequence of performance of a 
function is defined as the suspected or unsuspected outcome of an event predicated by a 
specific course of action or inaction. The likelihood of a consequence occurring is the 
probability of a suspected or unsuspected event actually taking place. It enables the 
estimation of unknown parameters based on known outcomes. 
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C.  RISK IDENTIFICATION 
As described in Chapter II, risk identification is the first key activity in the risk 
management process. It is the dynamic, imaginative, and iterative process of accessing 
the future or current risks of a program, program element, system, sub-system, or event 
by brainstorming, forecasting, or analyzing historical data to isolate root causes and begin 
developing mitigation and planning strategies [22, p. 7]. The intent of risk identification 
is to answer the following basic questions. 
• What can go wrong? 
• When can it go wrong? 
• Where can it go wrong? 
• How can it go wrong? 
• Why can it go wrong? 
• What is the impact or consequence if it goes wrong? 
• What is the likelihood that it will go wrong? 
D. ROOT CAUSES 
Root causes are those potential unknown events that adversely affect a program’s 
success if they occur at any time in its lifecycle [22, p. 8]. 
E. IDENTIFI ED RISKS  
As explored in the previous chapter, the six primary functions necessary to 
conduct an RCOH are to plan, communicate, budget, fund, execute, and manage the 
overhaul.  Each function has been evaluated to determine the potential risks that can deter 
a project team’s ability to meet its overall cost, schedule and performance goals. The 
risks presented by this research are not all inclusive; however, through private telephone 
interviews with key personnel from SUPSHIP NN (i.e., CVN 70 Project Supervisor, 
RCOH Maintenance Planning Manager, Code 180 (Contracting Department), and Code 
152 (Waterfront Operations Department)), they represent a conservative view of those 
risks as well as trends historically associated with an RCOH. Having only a minimal 
number of data points to extract from, this research assumes that the information 
provided below is accurate. 
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1. To Plan.  The risks associated with the planning function of an RCOH (Figure 14) 
include but are not limited to: 
1) Large amounts of unidentified work discovered necessary for accomplishment 
during the overhaul 
Likelihood 
Level 4, Highly Likely 
≈70% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 2, Budget increase by < 3% of budget 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 2, Minor reduction in supportability, can be tolerated with 
little or no impact on program objectives. 
 
2) Identified work not properly scheduled and integrated 
Likelihood 
Level 2, Low Likelihood 
≈30% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 2, Budget increase by < 3% of budget 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 3, Moderate reduction in technical performance or 
supportability, can be tolerated with little or no impact on program objectives. 
 
3) Lack of subject matter expertise during planning phase (government) 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% of budget 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
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4) Government technical requirements modification 
Likelihood 
Level 4, Highly Likely 
≈70% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase by < 10% of budget 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
 
5) Meeting inundation 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 2, Budget increase by < 1% of budget 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 2, Minor reduction in technical performance or 
supportability, can be tolerated with little or no impact on program. 
 
6) Ineffective IPTs due to unempowered decision makers 
Likelihood 
Level 3, Likely 
≈30% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 1, Minimal or no impact 
Schedule – Level 2, Able to meet key dates. 
Performance – Level 3, Moderate reduction in technical performance or 





7) Lack of formalized processes and strategies 
Likelihood 
Level 2, Low Likelihood 
≈30% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 1, Minimal or no impact 
Schedule – Level 2, Able to meet key dates. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
8) Lack of process standardization from one project to the next 
Likelihood 
Level 3, Likely 
≈50% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 1, Minimal or no impact 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
9) Lack of learning curve experienced by mentored(military) personnel providing 
government oversight 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 2, Budget increase by < 1%  
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 






10) Lack of information transparency 
Likelihood 
Level 2, Low Likelihood 
≈30% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5%  
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
11) Inexperienced project team leadership (government) 
Likelihood 
Level 4, Highly Likely 
≈70% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 5, Exceeds APB threshold 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path affected. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
12) Low Motivation/Morale 
Likelihood 
Level 2, Not Likely 
≈30% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase or unit production cost increase 
Schedule – Level 5, Cannot meet key program milestones 
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
13) Ambiguous, incomplete, or erroneous AWP work items 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈5% Probability of Occurrence 
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Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5%  
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 2, Minor reduction in supportability, can be tolerated with 
little or no impact on program. 
 
14) Erroneous IMS 
Likelihood 
Level 3, Likely 
≈50% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 2, Minor reduction in supportability, can be tolerated with 
little or no impact on program. 
 
2. To Communicate.  The risks associated with communicating (Figure 14) during 
RCOH include but are not limited to: 
 
1) Misinterpretation of technical requirements 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 2, Minor reduction in supportability, can be tolerated with 
little or no impact on program. 
 
2) Inaccurate work progressing 
Likelihood 
Level 2, Highly Likely 
≈70% Probability of Occurrence 
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Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
3) Unperformed scheduled work  
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
4) Unresolved work overlap 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
 
5) Adversarial relationship between government and contractor 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 






Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
 
6) Late material arrival 
Likelihood 
Level 2, Low Likelihood 
≈30% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 5, Cannot meet key program milestones. 
Performance – Level 4, Major shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize 
program success. 
 
7) Union strike 
Likelihood 
Level 2, Low Likelihood 
≈30% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 5, Cannot meet key program milestones. 
Performance – Level 5, Cannot meet KPP or key technical/supportability 
threshold; will jeopardize program success. 
 
8) Inadequate manpower resource loading 
Likelihood 
Level 4, Likely 





Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 4, Major shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize 
program success. 
 
9) Misunderstanding of maintenance priorities by contractor 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or 
major shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
 
10) Decreased safety awareness in shipyard 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Major schedule slip. Program critical path may be affected. 
Performance – Level 4, Major shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize 
program success. 
 
11) Inaccurate current ship maintenance project (CSMP) data 
Likelihood 
Level 4, Highly Likely 
≈70% Probability of Occurrence  




Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
3. To Bu dget. The risks associated with not properly budgeting (Figure 14) during an 
RCOH include but are not limited to: 
 
1) Excessive inaccurate cost estimation 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 5, Exceeds APB threshold 
Schedule – Level 1, Minimal or no impact. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
2) Improper cost control 
Likelihood 
Level 5, Highly Likely 
≈70% Probability of Occurrence  
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 5, Exceeds APB threshold 
Schedule – Level 1, Minimal or no impact. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
3) Inadequate Budget 
Likelihood 
Level 4, Highly Likely 





Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path may be affected.  
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
 
4) Improper of contract management 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 5, Exceeds APB threshold 
Schedule – Level 5, Cannot meet key program milestones.  
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/supportability threshold; will jeopardize program 
success. 
 
5) Improper assessment of ship’s material condition prior to RCOH beginning 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 1, Minimal or no consequence to technical performance. 
 
4. To Fund.  The risks associated with funding (Figure 14) an RCOH include but are not 
limited to: 
1) Late payments to contractor from government 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
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Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path affected. 
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/supportability threshold; will jeopardize program 
success. 
 
2) Program reprioritized 
Likelihood 
Level 3, Likely 
≈50% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget decrease by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/supportability threshold; will jeopardize program 
success. 
 
3) Program cancellation 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 1, No impact 
Schedule – Level 1, No impact 
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 








4) Countries national commitments (i.e., wars, housing market crisis, and 
financial rescue packages)  
Likelihood 
Level 3, Likely 
≈50% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget decrease by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or 
major shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
 
5) Prime contractor’s economic stability 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path affected. 
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/supportability threshold; will jeopardize program 
success. 
 
5. To Execute. The risks associated with executing an RCOH include but are not limited 
to: 
1) Schedule delay 
Likelihood 
Level 5, Near Certainty 
≈90% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path affected. 
Performance – Level 3, Moderate reduction in technical performance or 




Level 3, Likely 
≈50% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 3, Moderate reduction in technical performance or 
supportability, can be tolerated with little or no impact on program objectives. 
 
3) Reduced manpower (government/contractor)  
Likelihood 
Level 4, Highly Likely 
≈70% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 2, Budget increase by < 1% 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
 
4) Loss of trade skills (contractor) 
Level 3, Likely 
≈50% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 2, Budget increase by < 1% 
Schedule – Level 3, Minor schedule slip. Able to meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 





5) Excessive occupational injuries 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 2, Budget increase by < 1% 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path affected. 
Performance – Level 4, Significant degradation in technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability; may jeopardize program success. 
 
6) Unexpected hazards or natural disasters (i.e. nuclear spill, terrorist strike, 
major fire, flood, or act of god) 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Low Likelihood 
≈20% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path affected. 
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/supportability threshold; will jeopardize program 
success. 
 
6. To Manage. The risks associated with managing (Figure 14) an RCOH include but are 
not limited to: 
 
1) Loss of all key management personnel 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Not Likely  






Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 3, Budget increase by < 5% 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path affected. 
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/supportability threshold; will jeopardize program 
success. 
 
2) Unexpected mandated technical specifications (i.e., OSHA, NAVSEA) 
Likelihood 
Level 5, Near Certainty 
≈90% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path affected. 
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/supportability threshold; will jeopardize program 
success. 
 
3) Lack of team-building between government and contractor 
Likelihood 
Level 2, Low Likelihood 
≈30% Probability of Occurrence 
Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 1, Minimal or no impact 
Schedule – Level 1, Minimal or no impact 
Performance – Level 3, Moderate reduction in technical performance or 
supportability, can be tolerated with little or no impact on program objectives. 
 
4) Lack of accountability (government/contractor) 
Likelihood 
Level 1, Low Likelihood 
≈10% Probability of Occurrence 
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Consequence of Occurrence 
Cost – Level 4, Budget increase by < 10% 
Schedule – Level 4, Program critical path affected. 
Performance – Level 5, Severe degradation in technical performance; Cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/supportability threshold; will jeopardize program 
success. 
F. RISK ANALYSIS 
Risk analysis is the iterative process of actively considering the likelihood of the 
root cause occurrence, identifying the possible consequences in terms of performance, 
schedule, and cost and identifying the risk level using the Risk Reporting Matrix 
provided in Chapter II [22, p. 11]. The intent of risk analysis is to answer the following 
questions. 
• How big is the risk? 
• How often can it go wrong? 
• How often does it go wrong? 
G.    RISK MATRIX 
The following risk matrix, Figure 23, was compiled using the data from Section B 
and the technical expertise and guidance of various subject matter experts at SUPSHIP 
NN. Each risk was analyzed and evaluated based on their impact to the overall cost, 
schedule, and performance of the overhaul. Risks highlighted in green represent low-








C – Cost  
S - Schedule 
P - Performance 
 
Requirements and Risks:                                  
 
1.  Effectively plan RCOH 
1) 1A Large amounts of unidentified work discovered necessary for 
accomplishment during the overhaul. 
2) 1B Identified work not properly scheduled and integrated. 
3) 1C Lack of subject matter expertise during planning phase. 
4) 1D Government technical requirements modification. 
5) 1E Meeting inundation. 
6) 1F Ineffective IPTs due to underpowered decision makers. 
7) 1G Lack of formalized processes and strategies. 
8) 1H Lack of process standardization from one project to the next. 
9) 1I Lack of learning curve experienced by mentored personnel providing 
government oversight. 
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10) 1J Lack of information transparency. 
11) 1K Inexperienced project team leadership (government).  
12) 1L Low motivation/morale. 
13) 1M Ambiguous, incomplete, or erroneous AWP work items. 
14) 1N Erroneous IMS. 
2.  Effectively communicate during RCOH 
1) 2A Misinterpretation of technical requirements. 
2) 2B Inaccurate work progressing. 
3) 2C Unperformed scheduled work. 
4) 2D Unresolved work overlap. 
5) 2E Adversarial relationship between government and contractor. 
6) 2F Late material arrival. 
7) 2G Union strike. 
8) 2H Inadequate manpower resource loading. 
9) 2I Misunderstanding of priorities. 
10) 2J Decreased safety awareness. 
11) 2K Inaccurate CSMP data. 
3.  Effectively budget an RCOH 
1) 3A Excessive, inaccurate cost estimation. 
2) 3B Inadequate budget. 
3) 3C Lack of contract management. 
4) 3D Improper assessment of ship's material condition. 
4.  Effectively fund RCOH 
1) 4A Late payments to contractor from government. 
2) 4B Program reprioritized. 
3) 4C Program cancellation. 
4) 4D Country’s national commitments. 
5) 4E Prime contractor's economic instability. 
5.  Effectively execute RCOH. 
1) 5A Schedule delay. 
2) 5B Rework. 
3) 5C Reduced manpower. 
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4) 5D Loss of trade skills. 
5) 5E Excessive occupational injuries (contractor). 
6) 5F Unexpected hazards or natural disasters. 
6.  Effectively manage RCOH 
1) 6A Loss of all key management personnel. 
2) 6B Unexpected mandated technical specifications. 
3) 6C Lack of team-building. 
4) 6D Lack of accountability. 
 
 
Figure 24.   High Level RCOH Risk Analysis - Consequence Screening Matrix 
Using data from Figure 23, Figure 24 is a condensed, top-level risk matrix constructed to 
highlight the risks possessing the greatest impact to an RCOH. Some of the low-level 
risks include meeting inundation (1E), identified work not properly scheduled and 
integrated (1B), and improper assessment of ship's material condition (3D). Some of the 
moderate level risks are inaccurate work progressing (2B), 1N erroneous integrated 
master schedule (IMS), and excessive inaccurate cost estimation. Finally, the high level 
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risks include unexpected mandated technical specifications (6B), government technical 
requirements modification (1B), inadequate manpower resource loading (2I), inadequate 
budget (3B), reduced manpower (5C), inexperienced project team leadership (1K), 
program reprioritized (4B), and the loss of critical trade skills (5D).  
As previously stated in Section B, a consequence was the suspected or 
unsuspected outcome of an event predicated by a specific course of action or inaction. All 
of the aforementioned evaluated risks in their extreme and unmitigated cases resulted in 
the same two consequences. The two primary consequences were excessive cost overruns 
and schedule delay. The subsequent analysis and remainder of the chapter focused on 
developing risk mitigation strategies for the two primary consequences derived from 
Figures 23 and 24.  
H. RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
Section G revealed various risks that could negatively influence the successful 
management and completion an RCOH; however, this research focused on the two main 
consequences of those evaluated risks. Those consequences were excessive cost overruns 
and schedule slippage. 
Excessive cost overruns refer to the inability of an RCOH program to stay within 
its budgetary constraints due to improper cost control. Improper cost control describes the 
inability of a program office to manage the cost accounting, resource allocation and 
distribution, or earned value management of a project/program effectively. In earned 
value, excessive cost overruns occur when ACWP > BCWP at any given point in time on 
an earned value curve. ACWP is the actual cost of work performed and BCWP is the 
budgeted cost of work performed or the earned value (EV). In this case, cost efficiency is 
defined as the following. 
 
Cost Efficiency/Cost Performance Index [27] 
 CPI    =  BCWP / ACWP                          [4-1] 
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Excessive schedule slippage  can lead to late delivery, which refers to the 
extension of an RCOH outside of its contracted timeframe. For example, an RCOH is 
planned as a 33 – 40 month overhaul; however, to date, no RCOH has been completed 
within its initial contracted timeframe. In earned value, excessive schedule slippage leads 
to schedule delay, which is expressed when BCWS < BCWP at any given point in time 
on an earl value curve. In this case, schedule efficiency is defined as the following. 
 
Schedule Efficiency/Schedule Performance Index [27] 
 SPI    =  BCWP / BCWS                           [4-2] 
 
To address the aforementioned risks of excessive cost overruns and schedule slippage, 
this research proposes three strategies. 
The first strategy was to make no changes to the current RCOH process. It 
assumes that the current method of planning and conducting an RCOH is the most 
efficient because it leverages the lessons learned from each previous attempt. The second 
strategy was to reduce, eliminate, and defer certain types of work performed during an 
RCOH while also applying schedule compression techniques. In this option, mainly 
critical path (with limited non-critical path) maintenance would be performed during an 
overhaul. The third strategy was to increase the power efficiency of a carrier’s nuclear 
reactors with the goal of eliminating the need for refuelings. 
I. CHAPTE R SUMMARY 
Using the six main objectives to perform an RCOH derived from Chapter III, this 
chapter identified the risks associated with conducting an overhaul within the context of 
increasing cost and time effectiveness of a carrier’s overhaul. The risks were evaluated 
through an assessment of likelihood and consequences, as well as impact to the cost, 
schedule, and performance as defined in Chapter II. From this assessment, the risks were 
divided into low, moderate, and high levels. Using the program 
Probability/Consequences and Scheduling, a matrix was constructed to determine the 
major risks that could adversely affect an RCOH. From this matrix, ten (10) risks were 
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determined that could jeopardize the successful administration and completion of an 
overhaul. Of the ten risks discovered, two were selected for further in-depth analysis. 
From these two risks, three mitigations strategies were introduced and explored in 
Chapter V. 
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V. RISK MITIGATION AND ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the three mitigation strategies derived at the end of Chapter 
IV.  Section B, the first strategy, discusses how an RCOH is planned and executed and 
the implications associated with maintaining the current process. Section C discusses the 
impacts of reducing the scope of work in the availability work package (AWP) and 
conducting selected maintenance pier side as opposed to in dry-dock. Section D evaluates 
the strategy of increasing the energy efficiency of a carrier and Section E is an analysis of 
the alternatives. Section F summarizes the chapter. 
B.  STRATEGY ONE – ASSUME THE RISK 
The first strategy is to assume the risk of excessive cost growth and schedule 
delay by maintaining the current process. It assumes that the current process for 
conducting an RCOH is the most realistic solution and practical application due to the 
complexity of the evolution. This strategy is also deemed most appropriate since it 
inherits and leverages the experiences as well as lessons learned from previous overhauls.  
NGC is the only shipyard currently capable of building aircraft carriers in the 
United States and it has built all of the Navy’s carriers to date. Although Norfolk Naval 
Shipyard and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard can refuel nuclear ships and have dry-docks 
large enough to hold aircraft carriers, they do not have the facilities to refuel Nimitz-class 
carriers, nor do they have the workforce to accomplish the majority of the non-nuclear 
repair work. Since it was impractical or possible to sustain multiple shipyards capable of 
constructing and refueling nuclear aircraft carriers, NGC emerged as the sole source for 
these product lines. 
Due to the level of uncertainty associated with RCOHs, fixed-price contracts were 
not considered appropriate contract vehicles. This is because fixed-price contracts place 
all risk on the contractor, who then builds that risk into the contract price, potentially 
making RCOHs unaffordable. Instead, the standard type of contract typically chosen is a 
cost-type contract, with incentive fees.  
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The planning phase for an RCOH begins approximately five years prior to the 
start of the execution contract, with nominal schedule duration of 33 months. This five-
year planning period may be accompanied by condition changes within the shipyard such 
as total workload and trade skills shifting or labor problems. Additionally, these changes 
could be precipitated by events external to the RCOH. “Planning is a complex process 
because it merges three different objectives that compete for available funding: 
• Refueling, repairing, and upgrading the reactor plants and related systems 
(as set out in the nuclear work package). 
• Installing new, more-modern capabilities such as sensors, communications 
systems, and weapons systems (the modernization package). 
• Performing necessary repairs or replacements of other existing equipment 
and systems to restore their function (the repair package) [9, p. 13].” 
Early estimates of the work to be accomplished are generated from the draft 
nuclear and modernization packages, coupled with approximations of the repair package. 
These estimates form the basis for preliminary budget estimates. Preparation of the 
contract work package does not begin until the completion of a baseline availability work 
package (AWP). This is followed by preliminary authorized AWPs at the 36-, 12-, and 8-
month pre-execution windows [9, p. 20]. The authorized AWP is the focus of contract 
negotiations that ultimately leads to the negotiated contractor (NGC) work package and 
the ship’s force (SF) work package. 
Planning is complicated by several factors. First, the budget for the execution of 
an RCOH can suffer to fund other Navy commitments, and the resulting volatility in 
budget causes uncertainty in the planning process. Second, while planning proceeds, the 
ship being planned for is still operational. This limits the government’s ability to 
disassemble and inspect equipment, and accurately assess repair needs. Third, the Navy 
often delays design decisions to incorporate the latest war fighting capabilities.  
For nuclear work, NGC and NAVSEA O8 develop a carrier reactor-plant 
overhaul package (CARPOP) that specifies all of the work to be accomplished during the 
RCOH. The CARPOP is constructed from requirements in the Commissioned Surface 
Ship General Reactor Plant Overhaul and Repair Specifications and other standardized 
maintenance requirements imbedded in the Budgeting, Planning, and Contracting for the 
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RCOH technical documentation governing the operation and maintenance of the reactor 
plant and related systems. Also, some testing for potential nuclear (as well as non-
nuclear) work is coordinated by SUPSHIP NN Code 1800 in accordance with the Carrier-
Availability Planning System (CAPS) [9, pp. 20-21].  
The modernization management plan (MMP) governs the development of the 
(non-nuclear) modernization package. Norfolk Naval Shipyard is the hull-planning yard 
for Nimitz-class ships and provides the lead design services to support the modernization 
package, and other communities [9, pp. 21-23].  
Modifications to the contract work package (AWP) occur mostly during the 
execution phase of the RCOH. Many of the tasks in the basic work package involve 
opening and inspection of portions of the ship (i.e., tanks and voids) to determine whether 
repairs are necessary. Tasks not explicitly covered in the authorized work package are 
subject to change control. NAVSEA O8 manages changes to the nuclear work package, 
while changes to the modernization and repair work packages are subject to the 
requirements of the PMP. “Changes are classified into one of several possible levels of 
importance.  
• Those affecting ship characteristics or delivery dates required approval by 
the CNO.  
• Those having other “significant” or “adverse” effects required PMS 312 
approval. SUPSHIP NN may have the authority to approve lesser changes. 
What constitutes a lesser change can vary over the course of an RCOH. 
Requests for changes typically originate at the shipyard level. NGC upon 
finding a problem not covered by the work package first decides whether 
to seek specific reimbursement for the extra work. If so, an inspection 
report (IR) is prepared for SUPSHIP NN, describing the nature of the 
problem. IRs are usually reviewed by SUPSHIP NN production 
controllers (PC) and assistant project officers (APO); called assistant 
project supervisors (APS) on CVN 70 RCOH. At the start of an RCOH, 
there are usually four APSs: nuclear, propulsion, hull/deck 
machinery/outfitting, and combat systems. For the last 18-months of the 
RCOH, this group is reduced to one APS for propulsion systems and one 
APS for everything else, each assisted by 5 to 10 PCs. The team 
determines whether the issue revealed in the IR is already covered by the 
work package (if so, no further contract action is necessary). If not, the 
APSs and SUPSHIP NN Engineering department determined whether the 
items should be fixed, and if so, who should do the work (i.e., NGC, SF or 
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CCT); they also determined the implications regarding the contract. The 
criteria used for deciding is expert opinion, weighing how critical the work 
is, and its (work) cost estimation. If the team (APSs and PCs) agree that 
the IR issue needs to be addressed, a field modification requisition (FMR) 
is initiated. A FMR is the vehicle by which any additions to the authorized 
work package are made following issuance of the RFP. For example, on 
the CVN 68 RCOH, approximately 6,300 FMRs were issued. Each FMR 
leads negotiations between the NGC and SUPSHIP NN Contract 
Departments as to the cost of the task, a contract change specification 
(adding cost and potential time to the RCOH contract) or to funding via of 
a level-of-effort (LOE) set aside through the SVC or E&S pool [9, pp. 26-
29].” 
During an RCOH, the baseline contract is modified a number of times to include 
additional tasking and changes in the original plans and schedules. Some contract 
modifications involve adding funds to the basic contract while other modifications do not 
change the funding but change the distribution of funds within contract line-item numbers 
(CLINs). Also, some modifications change the scheduled completion date of an RCOH or 
modify tasks without any increase in funding requirements [9, p. 29]. 
Under the current process, no RCOH has been completed within its initial 
schedule and proposed budget. For example, the first award for the CVN 68 RCOH 
planning contract to NGC was for $2.85 million. It included eight contract line-item 
numbers for the start of advance planning and support for the RCOH. As additional 
advance-planning funds were authorized in successive fiscal years, the basic contract was 
modified a number of times to include additional tasks and funds. By the end of the 
planning stage, NGC had been awarded almost $400 million for planning and support of 
the RCOH. In addition, during the RCOH, a four-month long union strike caused the 
delivery date of the CVN 68 to be extended 80 days out from March 5, 2001, to May 24, 
2001. The 80-day extension was necessitated by delays in performing propulsion-plant 
work that was on the critical path of the RCOH. The Navy approved the 80-day schedule 
delay [9, pp. 99-101] and the RCOH total cost was approximately $3.15 billion [14].  
During the CVN 69 RCOH, the Navy reset the contract target cost from $1.36 
billion to $1.49 billion at completion. The contract modification extended the end date of 
the USS Eisenhower RCOH by 11 weeks to November 6, 2004 and was implemented due 
to the realignment of work priorities to help assist with the completion of the USS 
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Enterprise’s extended dry-docking selected restricted availability (SRA) [14]. The 
modification also addressed the unforeseen impact of Hurricane Isabel setting the final 
cost of the RCOH at approximately $3.18 billion [13].  
A statistical analysis of RCOH data reveals the low likelihood of future successful 
programs. The equations below show the likelihood of a RCOH successfully completing 
based on the three previous attempts. Successfully completed is defined as an RCOH 
being accomplished within the parameters of its initial contract limits (i.e., below or 
within its contracted target cost and schedule). The conclusions extracted from these 
calculations are subjective due to the minimal amount of data points available for 
analysis; however, they provide a general impression of the difficulty of this event. For 
example, two RCOHs have been completed and one is nearing completion. Assuming 
that the CVN 70 will complete within its designated time frame (March 2009), the 
probability of an RCOH completing on schedule is 1/3 or 33%. Since there are 11 carriers 
in the Navy, and three have undergone overhauls, eight RCOHs remain. Assuming that 
each RCOH is independent, the likelihood that all remaining RCOHs will be completed 
successfully is 0%. The assumption of independence is based on a few conditions. First, 
each RCOH is comprised almost entirely of new management personnel (government). 
Second, the material condition of each carrier varies widely with near total dependence 
on its previous operational tempo. Third, the contract negotiations and responsibilities for 
each RCOH vary based on the needs of the Navy and its enterprise strategy. Therefore, 
the contracts for each RCOH are fundamentally different. For example, NGC was 
designated the lead maintenance activity (LMA) during the CVN 70 RCOH but not 
during the CVN 68 overhaul. Fourth, the external influences that affect each RCOH are 
different. For example, the CVN 68 RCOH was extended due to a 4-month long union 
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If assuming that the CVN 69 completed on schedule, the probability that the eight 
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The likelihood of at least one in the remaining eight completing successfully is 99%. 
8




⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
Neglecting the influence of a learning curve, the data reveals that under the 
current process of conducting an RCOH, the probability of the successful completion of 
all eight remaining carrier overhauls is unlikely; however, it is certain that at least one 
will be completed within its initial contracted parameters. In a private interview with Dr. 
Samuel Buttrey, a Probability and Statistics professor at NPS, the following formula was 







For example, in the Excel model shown below (Table 2), if the probability of the 
first three RCOHs completing successfully is 33% and the learning experienced between 
each overhaul is approximately 10%, then likelihood of the fourth trial completing 
successfully is 39%, the fifth 45% and so forth. Figure 25 illustrates that the highest 
probability for successful completion under the current process is roughly 70% during the 
eleventh RCOH. The amount of learning assumed is based on the reasonable ideology  
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that if an event is experienced more than once by human beings, there is an expected 
amount of growth or learning associated with that particular event; however, a method of 
accurately quantifying learning is beyond the scope of this research.  
 
Starting Probability (Bo) Trial (t) P(Successful Completion) Ship 
0.33 3 0.33 CVN 70 
Learning (Lo) 4 0.39 CVN 71 
0.1 5 0.45 CVN 72 
 6 0.50 CVN 73 
  7 0.55 CVN 74 
  8 0.59 CVN 75 
 9 0.63 CVN 76 
 10 0.67 CVN 77 
 11 0.70 CVN 78 
























Figure 25.   Graph of Notional RCOH Forecast 
C.  STRATEGY TWO – CONTROL AND TRANSFER THE RISK 
The second strategy was to control and transfer the risk of historically increasing 
RCOH cost and schedule delay through work redistribution, cancellation, and deferment. 
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It (the strategy) relies on a functional area planners (FAP) keen understanding of the 
material condition of the ship, required maintenance schedule duration, and available 
resources. There are four types of maintenance applications of which an RCOH is 
comprised. They are preventative maintenance, performance based maintenance, 
condition based maintenance, and remedial maintenance. 
Preventive maintenance (PM) is a schedule of planned maintenance actions aimed 
at the prevention of future failures. It is designed to preserve and enhance equipment 
reliability by replacing worn components before they actually fail. Preventive 
maintenance activities include equipment checks, partial or complete overhauls at 
specified periods, oil changes, lubrication and so on. In addition, workers can record 
equipment deterioration so they know to replace or repair worn parts before they cause 
system failure [28].  
Performance based maintenance (PBM) defines the minimum maintenance 
conditions that have to be met through observational measures to sustain a piece of an 
equipment’s or systems adequate operational usage [29].  
Condition based maintenance (CBM) is an attempt to maintain the right 
equipment at the right time. It is based on using real-time data to prioritize and optimize 
maintenance resources. Observing the state of the system is known as condition 
monitoring. Such a system will determine the equipment's health, and act only when 
maintenance is actually necessary. Development in recent years have allowed extensive 
instrumentation of equipment, and together with better tools for analyzing condition data, 
the maintenance personnel of today are more than ever able to decide what is the right 
time to perform maintenance on some piece of equipment. Ideally condition based 
maintenance will allow the maintenance personnel to do only the right things, minimizing 
spare parts cost, system downtime and time spent on maintenance [30].   
Corrective maintenance (CM) is maintenance performed as required, on an 
unscheduled basis, by the contractor following equipment failure. It provides a procedure 
of repairing components or equipment as necessary either by on-site repair or by 
replacing individual elements to keep the system in an adequate state of operation [31]. 
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According the SUPSHIP NN RCOH Planning Manager, most work planned during an 
overhaul is categorized as preventive while additional work added to the contract through 
the IR and FMR process is corrective based.  
Reducing the scope of work in the RCOH work package involves limiting an 
RCOH to only essential preventive, performance based, condition based, and corrective 
maintenances. In the context of this research, essential is defined as nuclear and limited 
non-nuclear work since the critical path of an RCOH is the nuclear propulsion repairs and 
refueling [32]. Figure 26 displays an example of an RCOH key event schedule.  
 
Figure 26.   Example RCOH Key Event Schedule (From: [33]) 
By reducing and redistributing the amount of non-nuclear work (i.e., habitability, 
combats systems, and deck machinery) that can be conducted during a Depot Level 
Maintenance Availability (within a continuous maintenance cycle), the Navy can 
generate some cost savings.  
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Eliminating or de-scoping specific types of work is common to RCOHs. It is 
usually initiated by Congress to help fund other equally or more important programs. 
When Congress removes money out of the RCOH work package, it is the project team’s 
responsibility to cancel work that will least affect the ship’s mission readiness. One of 
areas of maintenance often chosen to remove is habitability work. Habitability work 
includes, but is not limited to, tiling, lagging, refurbishments, alterations, and installations 
and general beautification of the ship. It is often chosen as first to remove because, 
according to the SUPSHIPNN RCOH Project Supervisor and Planning Manager, it is less 
complicated to plan, SF can conduct a majority of the repairs, and it is less complicated to 
re-integrate in the package once money is regained. Another area prime for cancellation 
is the combat systems work. Combat systems work includes all infrastructure, distributive 
systems, alterations, installations, upgrades, and repairs associated with the ship’s 
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) system. It is 
generally less expensive, conducted toward the end of the overhaul, and can be done 
relatively quickly. Since no work is usually removed from the nuclear package, this 
research suggests removing a reasonable amount of non-nuclear repairs from the AWP. 
The non-nuclear work can be a driver for cost overruns during refueling. In Refueling and 
Complex Overhaul of the USS Nimitz (CVN 68), Lessons for the Future, the authors 
determined that the nuclear portion of the CVN 68 RCOH had been accomplished within, 
or even below, the original contract cost leaving the non-nuclear portion accountable for 
the significant cost growth experienced. Reducing the nonessential, (work that can be 
conducted pier side during a regular maintenance cycle) non-nuclear work also has other 
benefits.  
If much of the non-nuclear work capable of being accomplished outside of an 
RCOH was removed from the AWP, it would promote open competition between 
competing shipyards (Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and NGC), 
which would enable the Navy to receive the best price for the desired work. As it stands, 
the Navy has little leverage with NGC over cost or schedule control since they are the 
sole source provider for carrier RCOHs. Reducing the non-nuclear work equates to 
reducing the amount of person-hours within an RCOH contract, which ultimately reduces 
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its total cost; however, this does not necessarily reduce its duration. The duration can be 
reduced by shortening the critical path work. The critical path work can be shortened by 
utilizing the cost savings from the reduced non-nuclear work to solely expedite the 
nuclear package through fast tracking or crashing the schedule. Fast tracking involves 
completing critical path activities in parallel that were originally planned in series. It 
often results in rework, usually increases risk, and requires more attention to 
communication [34]. Crashing is making cost and schedule tradeoffs to determine how to 
obtain the greatest amount of schedule compression for the least incremental cost while 
maintaining project scope; it usually results in increased costs [34]. Fast tracking or/and 
crashing the RCOH schedule are two viable options for schedule compression assuming 
that the resources (i.e., trade skills, specialized equipment, and labor) to do so are 
available.  
D.  STRATEGY THREE – AVOIDING THE RISK 
The third strategy is to avoid the risk of excessive cost growth and schedule delay 
by increasing the power efficiency of carriers with the goal of eliminating the need for 
refuelings. It relies on modern technological advances in power distribution, efficiency, 
and quality to extend the service life of the reactor. Nuclear and conventional propulsion 
systems for Navy ships and submarines have both been improved in recent years. For 
example, nuclear power plants are now simpler in design, smaller, require less 
maintenance and personnel, and have an extended lifecycle. These reported 
improvements have eliminated the need for refueling newer submarines, such as the 
Virginia-class submarines whose reactor service life is now 33-years. Also, the first 
aircraft carrier to be built under the CVN 21 program, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), 
will have a newly designed nuclear power plant. Delivery of CVN 78 is expected in fiscal 
year 2015 [35, p. 6]. 
Since 1977, the Navy has had a program to improve platform fuel efficiency. It 
has focused primarily on legacy systems and estimates that it has reduced the fuel 
consumption of the aircraft fleet by 6 percent [36, p. 50]. Furthermore, the Navy spent 
over $212 million from fiscal years 2003 through 2005, and plans to invest an additional 
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$264 million from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 to develop propulsion and ship support 
technologies designed to make future ships more fuel efficient and mission effective. 
These technologies are at various levels of maturity and are not yet ready for 
implementation. There is a focus on making electric motors smaller but more powerful, 
using high-speed generators without reduction gears, and using fuel cells. These motors 
still require fossil fuel as an energy source, but have the potential to reduce the amount 
needed and to improve ship operations [35, p. 3].  
According to Office of Naval Research officials, improvements to 
electrical components will generally improve fuel efficiency and overall 
mission effectiveness of future Navy surface ships. For example, 
superconducting motors, using special wiring to lower the resistance of 
electricity flow and employing cryogenics to reduce temperatures within 
the motor, will be more powerful and smaller, thereby reducing weight 
and saving onboard space for other purposes. High-speed generators, also 
projected to be smaller, will make it possible to couple high-speed gas 
turbine engines directly to the generators without the use of reduction 
gears, thereby reducing weight, saving space, and making the engines 
more fuel-efficient. Conversely, the fuel cell technology the Office of 
Naval Research is pursuing involves extracting hydrogen from diesel fuel, 
which can be safely stored and transferred at sea, according to the official. 
The hydrogen is used to produce electrical power without the use of diesel 
or gas turbine engines. The use of fuel cells would also permit a ship’s 
power system to be dispersed throughout the ship, increasing the ship’s 
ability to survive if attacked, according to Navy officials. These systems 
target a 30- to 50-percent improvement in fuel efficiency and reduced 
maintenance compared to current power plants. The more advanced 
molten carbonate and solid oxide systems provide higher efficiencies, 
especially if the high quality waste heat is captured. The Navy’s challenge 
is to develop high energy density, marine environment compatible 
systems, and compact, efficient, and reliable fuel reforming systems 
capable of handling marine diesel fuels [36, p. 57]. 
The Office of Naval Research officials stated that fuel cell technology is 
promising for future naval application and has already completed some prototype testing; 
however, that the technology is at least 3- to 5-years away from acquisition consideration 
[35, p. 7]. 
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The Navy has a range of technologies that improve the efficiency of its ships. The 
utilization of these technologies and products has been primarily through no- and low-
cost routes, such as the normal overhaul process or procedural changes. Some of 
technologies for achieving energy efficiency in Navy platforms are in fleet diesel power 
plants, hull coating and cleaning, auxiliary systems, sensors, controls and procedures, and 
hotel loads (i.e., functions such as lighting and fresh water production) [36, pp. 52, 53].  
Dr. Amory Lovins, the director of the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) and a 
member of the Defense Science Board (DSB) task force, estimated that up to 30% of the 
Navy's non-aviation fuel appeared to be used to generate power for hotel loads. In 2001, 
the RMI conducted a study for the Navy on the energy use of the USS Princeton (CG-
59). It found that hotel loads on these ships could be substantially reduced. According to 
the DSB report, the study found retrofittable hotel-load electric savings potential on the 
order of 20 to 50 percent. Many of the savings opportunities were purely operational, 
requiring little or no investment. In an online article about the RMI study, Dr. Lovins 
stated:  
The Naval Sea Systems Command's [NAVSEA's] able engineers had 
estimated that 19 percent could be saved on ships of this class, of which 
Princeton was in the top one fourth for efficiency. Our preliminary survey 
found gratifyingly large potential savings: perhaps, if found feasible, as 
much as several times NAVSEA's expectations. The RMI team found that 
retrofitting motors, pumps, fans, chillers, lights, and potable water systems 
could save an estimated 20-50 percent of the ship's electricity. That could 
cut total fuel use by an estimated 10-25 percent.  
Just as in civilian facilities ashore, the RMI team started by calculating 
what it's worth to save a kilowatt-hour. Since the electricity is being made 
inefficiently from fuel that's mainly delivered by “oiler” ships, the answer 
is 27 cents, six times a typical industrial tariff ashore. This high cost 
makes “megawatts” a prime target for significant reductions. For example, 
each percentage point of improved efficiency in a single 100-horsepower 
always-on motor is worth $1,000 a year. Each chiller could be improved to 
save its own capital cost's worth of electricity (about $120,000) every 
eight months. About $400,000 a year could be saved if -- under 
noncritical, low-threat conditions -- certain backup systems were set to 
come on automatically when needed rather than running all the time. Half 
that saving could come just from two 125-horsepower firepumps that 
currently pump seawater continuously aboard, around the ship, and back 
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overboard. Princeton's total electricity-saving potential could probably cut 
her energy costs by nearly $1 million a year, or about $10 million in 
present value [over the ship's lifecycle], while improving her warfighting 
capability [37]. 
E.  ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES (AOA) 
As described in Sections B through D, the three mitigation strategies proposed for 
increasing cost and time effectiveness during an RCOH are (1) assume the risk by 
maintaining the current process, (2) control the risk through reduced work and schedule 
compression and (3) avoid the risk by increasing the energy efficiency of a carrier to 
ultimately eliminate the need for nuclear refueling. Chapter I defined effC  as any 
modification(s) in planning, scheduling, and/or conducting an RCOH that resulted I the 
following. 
• less cost for the more performance (work accomplished) than the previous 
RCOH 
• less cost for the same amount of performance of the previous RCOH 
• less cost for less performance than previous RCOH 
• same cost for more performance than previous RCOH 
TE was defined as any modification(s) in planning, scheduling and/or conducting an 
RCOH that resulted in a schedule duration of less than or equal to 33 months. It was also 
broadly defined as the following. 
• less time for the more performance (work accomplished) 
• less time for the same amount of performance 
• less time for less performance than previous 
• same time for more performance 
The following is a qualitative analysis of strategies one through three based on the 
data found within the context of this thesis.  
1 – Strategy One: Maintain Current Process 
Pros 
• There is a since of process familiarity since almost three RCOHs have 
been completed. 
• There is less planning and execution uncertainty due to process 
familiarity. 
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• Each RCOH incorporates the lessons learned from previous overhauls. 
• There is some level of learning experienced (learning curve). 
Cons 
• It is difficult to forecast program success. 
• It is difficult to quantify learning. 
• The current process does not take into consideration a severely constrained 
budget. 
• There is an issue of economic vulnerability to sole source contractor.  
2 – Strategy Two: Reduce Work and Schedule Compression 
Pros 
• There is an overall schedule duration reduction. 
• There is a less complicated planning process. 
• There are less planning costs. 
• There is less integration required. 
Cons 
• There is the potential for reduced modernization and combat superiority. 
• There is the potential for increased program risk. 
• There is the potential for increased cost risk. 
3 – Strategy Three: Increase Power Efficiency/Eliminate RCOH 
Pros 
• There is minimal cost or schedule impact. 
• There is the potential for increased power efficiency. 
• There is the potential for increased operational availability. 
Cons 
• There are increased costs throughout the maintenance lifecycle. 
• There are potentially longer planned incremental availabilities (PIA)s. 
• The power efficiency technologies are currently immature. 




Figure 27 graphically compares the results of the individual analyses. The red 
squares represent undesirable outcomes with greater cost and time being the least 
desirable outcome. The green squares present desirable outcomes with less cost and time 
being the most desirable outcome. The blue squares represent acceptable outcomes based 
on the priorities of the program office. The numbers 1, 2, and 3 represent each mitigation 
strategy, respectively. The following analysis was conducted through expert opinion and 
interviews with key RCOH maintenance personnel. The data was analyzed using $1.9 
billion and 33 months as the baseline cost and schedule duration (see Chapter I). The top 
horizontal row in the matrix represents the possibility of an RCOH costing more, the 
same, or less than $ 1.9 billion while the far left column represents an RCOH taking 
more, the same, or less time than 33 months.  
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Figure 27.   Cost, Time, and Solution Matrix. 
The matrix shows that within the context of this thesis, the least desirable outcome is 
strategy one (1) while the optimal solution to increase cost and time effectiveness of an 






F.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter assessed the three mitigation strategies derived at the end of Chapter 
IV.  It discussed how an RCOH is planned and executed and the implications associated 
with maintaining the current process. It also discussed the impacts of reducing the scope 
of work in the availability work package (AWP) while compressing the overall schedule. 
It then discussed advancements in reactor technologies and the possibility for more power 
efficient carriers with the goal of eliminating the need for refueling. An AoA was 
provided to illustrate graphically the differences in the strategies and an optimal solution 
(strategy three) was determined. This next chapter is the recommendation based on the 
scope of this research followed by the conclusion.  
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the conclusions, recommendations, and future work 
generated from completing this thesis. Section B discusses how this thesis addressed the 
research question presented in Chapter I. Section C discusses general findings and 
conclusions regarding the premise of this thesis. Section D summarizes the 
recommendation generated as a result of completing the research and analysis for this 
thesis. Section E summarizes potential areas for future work identified during the course 
of the thesis. Section F summarizes the chapter. 
B. DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question described in Chapter I was developed to provide a focal 
area for the thesis and shape the research’s subsequent analysis of the data collected. The 
author found that the research and analysis conducted over the course of this thesis met 
the objectives set forth in the original research question. The methodology presented in 
Chapter I, Section F was used successfully to address the research question: By reducing 
risk, how can the Navy decrease the time in lay-up and increase the cost effectiveness of 
a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier in dry dock during the execution phase of an RCOH? 
This research question set an objective to investigate the process in which the 
Navy plans, schedules, and conducts RCOHs to access the likelihood of reducing a 
carriers execution cost and time in layup. 
The information provided in Chapter II discussed the concept of risk, its 
management, key activities, and application as a systematic approach to the expeditious 
and thorough evaluation of complex systems or systems of systems under various 
operational and extreme conditions. 
Chapter III described the stakeholders in an RCOH and defined their impact or 
ability to be impacted by the overhaul. The functional decomposition partitions 
conducting an RCOH into six primary functions: (1) to plan, (2) to communicate, (3) to 
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budget, (4) to fund, (5) to execute, and (6) to manage. These six primary functions were 
further analyzed to provide a broad overview of what an RCOH required in terms of 
labor hours, resources, and planning. From the “to plan” function, seven major industrial 
components were determined that characterized the planning phase of the overhaul. It 
revealed that these major industrial complexes determined the type and scope of work 
accomplished during the overhaul. A process flow diagram was then presented that 
illustrated the sequence of events necessary to coordinate and institute an RCOH effort 
starting with congressional authorization to the aircraft carrier’s redelivery to the Navy.  
Chapter IV used the six main objectives to perform an RCOH found in Chapter III 
to identify risks associated with conducting an overhaul within the context of increasing 
cost and time effectiveness. The risks were evaluated and assessments of likelihood, 
consequences, and impact to the cost, schedule, and performance (see Section D of 
Chapter II) were made. From this assessment, the risks were divided into low, moderate, 
and high levels. Using the software application Probability/Consequences and 
Scheduling, a matrix was constructed to determine the major risks that could adversely 
affect an RCOH. From this matrix, ten risks were determined that could jeopardize the 
successful administration and completion of an overhaul. Of the ten risks discovered, two 
were selected for further in-depth analysis. From these two risks, three mitigations 
strategies were introduced and analyzed. 
Chapter V assessed the three mitigation strategies derived at the end of Chapter 
IV. Strategy 1 focused on RCOH planning and execution, along with the implications 
associated with maintaining the current process. Strategy 2 discussed the impacts of 
reducing the scope of work in the availability work package (AWP) while compressing 
the overall schedule. Strategy 3 discussed advancements in reactor technology and the 
possibility of more power efficient carriers with the goal of eliminating the need for 
refueling. An analysis of alternates graphically illustrated the differences in the strategies 
and the best solution of the three (strategy 3) was determined as the most time and cost 
effective solution.  
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C.  CONCLUSION REGARDING THE THESIS PREMISE 
The premise of this thesis was that by utilizing risk management within the 
systems engineering process, solutions for confronting the growing costs and durations of 
RCOHs were possible. To evaluate this premise, one needs full access to cost data 
records, work breakdown structures, and integrated master schedules from the previous 
RCOHs. Although this study did not include this type of quantitative data, the research 
found much evidence to support this premise throughout policies, guides, and processes. 
The following paragraphs summarize the conclusions founded on evidence presented 
throughout the thesis. 
1.  Each RCOH is Unique 
As discussed in Chapter I, each RCOH has been longer than the prescribed 33-
month duration and the costs have steadily increased over time. Although each carrier’s 
maintenance is planned using historical, parametric, and empirical data, each aircraft 
carrier’s material condition and program office’s priority is unique which makes the 
maintenance requirements (non-nuclear and nuclear work packages) unique. Due to the 
randomness in the ship’s material condition, the government’s desired level of 
modernization, and the prime contractors increasing service costs (mentioned in Chapter 
V), a precise duration as well as cost for an RCOH is difficult to forecast accurately 
based on only three such attempts.  
2.  An RCOH Schedule is Dependent upon the Work in the Nuclear 
Package 
As discussed in Chapter V, the nuclear work package or CARPOP is the critical 
path of an RCOH. To compress a RCOH schedule, the nuclear work package would need 
to be fast tracked, crashed, or reduced. As stated previously in Chapter V, fast tracking 
involves completing critical path activities in parallel originally planned in the series. 
Crashing is making cost and schedule tradeoffs to determine how to obtain the greatest 
amount of schedule compression for the least incremental cost while maintaining project 
scope. These strategies may increase technical performance risk. An increase in technical 
performance risk may result in an increase in maintenance errors, which may lead to an 
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increase in equipment errors, which may exacerbate safety hazards, which may result in 
loss of life. Additionally, according to a SUPSHIP NN Contract Specialist, the increase in 
risk would be accompanied by an increase in service, overhead, and labor (overtime) 
costs. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 27, fast tracking results in an effectiveness 
profile that poses greater cost for equal performance. Further studies on the relationship 
between schedule compression, cost, and the risks associated with nuclear propulsion 
work during an RCOH are warranted and beyond the scope of this research. However, 
with that said, it is the author’s unsubstantiated opinion that the increase in performance 
risk as well as the potential overall increase in cost was undesirable compared to the 
schedule compression. 
3. Time and Cost Effectiveness Are Not Possible without Loss 
As discussed above, decreasing the schedule duration by fast tracking or crashing 
resulted in greater performance risk to the nuclear propulsion work package. Performance 
risk was defined by this thesis as the probability of correctly accomplishing a task within 
a specific set of parameters, constraints, and time.  If not properly mitigated, a nuclear 
propulsion performance risk may ultimately result in a loss of mission readiness, 
operational availability, or life.  
To cut costs, this research suggested limiting the amount of non-nuclear work 
accomplished during an RCOH, which in turn, limits the amount of modernization 
anticipated by the Navy once the carrier is redelivered to the fleet. This would be deemed 
a performance loss to the Navy because (1) much non-nuclear work historically 
accomplished would be delayed, and (2) the ship would return to the fleet without any 
enhancements thereby threatening its technical superiority (“tip of the spear” 
philosophy). The deferred modernization work package would be accomplished during 
the regular carrier maintenance cycle and may have a greater impact on its maintenance 
intervals.  
Finally, an RCOH is scheduled for a specific amount of time and cost. However, 
during an overhaul, hundreds of inspection reports, additional mandated technical 
requirements, and engineering change proposals are issued. Hypothetically, if the 
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program office refused to integrate any of the requested changes into the AWP in an 
effort to stay on cost and schedule, then the risk associated with not having that specific 
work accomplished would be transferred to the customer (ship’s force). However, the risk 
would result in some type of loss experienced by an operator. Therefore, it would be 
deemed an operation loss.  
4. Greater Gains in Energy Efficiency  May Be Possible w ith Low to No  
Cost from the Government 
As discussed in Chapter V, Dr. Amory Lovins estimates that as much as 30% of 
the Navy's non-aviation fuel appeared to be used to generate power for hotel loads. A 
study of the USS Princeton found retrofittable hotel-load electric savings potential on the 
order of 20 to 50 percent, with significant future opportunities to assess. Many of the 
savings opportunities were purely operational, requiring little or no investment. Although 
some of Dr. Lovins results are questionable, further studies on the relationship between 
hotel services, power efficiency, and carrier operations are warranted beyond the scope of 
this research. By conducting future studies on carrier platforms coupled with the 
continual advancements in reactor technology mentioned in Section D of Chapter V, the 
Navy may be able to experience the same or greater results than those suggested by the 
CG-59. 
D.  SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made for further accomplishment of RCOHs 
in general. Successful implementation of the recommendations summarized below will 
help stem the growing costs and durations associated with carrier overhauls.   
1.  To Do or Not To Do  
From the data gathered during the course of writing this research, the author 
believes that the most cost and time effective method for addressing the challenge of 
increasing costs and durations of RCOHs is not to conduct them at all. The comparative 
data analysis from Section E of Chapter V supports the same conclusion revealing that 
improving power efficiency and thereby extending the service of the nuclear reactor and 
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eliminating the need for refueling (strategy 3) was the best of the three solutions. As 
discussed in Section D of Chapter V, the innovations and advancements in nuclear 
reactors currently only apply to submarines with the first aircraft carrier application in 
2015. Furthermore, the lifecycle of an aircraft carrier is 50 years whereas the extended 
life service of the new reactors is 33 years. Additionally, to increase power efficiency on 
aircraft carriers, a complete case study would need to be conducted to determine what 
equipment could be replaced, upgraded, or retrofitted as well as what technical 
specifications and logistic support would need to be eliminated, revamped, or updated.   
Similarly, the option to maintain the current process is not viable since the 
economic stability of the government is in recovery and is strained by national 
commitments [38]. Through the evaluation of the data contained within this research, it is 
the author’s sole opinion that maintaining the current RCOH process is not an aggressive 
strategic countermeasure for combating rising costs and extended schedule durations.  
a.  Cost Effectiveness 
With respect to increasing the cost effectiveness of an RCOH, this 
research recommends limiting the amount of non-nuclear work in the AWP and deferring 
that work to either a selective restrictive availability (SRA) or a regularly schedule 
maintenance interval (i.e., PIA or DPIA). As stated in Section E Chapter V, a reduction in 
cost will be experienced due to the reduced amount of person-hours, planning, scheduling 
and integration associated with NGC’s designation as the LMA. This research does not 
provide specific work to remove nor was it within its scope to do so; however, it does 
suggest some areas of strong scrutiny such as habitability, and combat systems 
maintenance. The rationale for this suggestion is based on the idea of open competition. 
With the Navy’s designation of NGC as the sole provider for carrier overhauls, it (the 
Navy) has very little leverage or control over cost during contract negotiations (often 
awarded a cost plus incentive fee contracted supplemented by levels of efforts) and 
execution. If a majority of the non-nuclear repair work could be offered to more 
shipyards for accomplishment, the government would receive competitive prices for the  
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work to be accomplished. This would give the government more flexibility in the 
decision making process and would encourage NGC to compete with its peers for 
continued government funding. 
b. Time Effectiveness 
As discussed in Chapter V, the critical path of an RCOH is the nuclear 
propulsion work package. If schedule duration is the priority of the program office, then 
with respect to time effectiveness, it is the author’s recommendation that NAVSEA 08 
scrutinizes the types of work in the CARPOP and determines what work can be 
accelerated or compressed. This inherently increases the risk and cost to the program but 
if planned in advanced, many of the concerns may be mitigated. 
c. Time and Cost Effectiveness 
To achieve both time and cost effectiveness simultaneously, the author 
recommends no longer conducting RCOHs because, within the scope of thesis, they are 
inherently cost and time ineffective.  
From a time effective perspective, there is not a large enough sample size 
(three RCOHs) to conclusively support any single point of view statistically but 
according to the data collected from the previous RCOHs, it can be inferred that the 33-
month schedule duration may not be enough time to complete an overhaul successfully 
(see Chapter I). Further studies on the relationship between a variety of schedule 
durations (i.e., 36-, 40-, and 42-months), cost, and operational availability are warranted 
and beyond the scope of this research. However, it is the author’s opinion that RCOHs 
planned and conducted under the premise of completing within a 33-month window are 
inherently time ineffective. 
From a cost effectiveness perspective, the final cost of an RCOH to the 
government is 70% of what it costs to build a new aircraft carrier. Listed below (Figure 




for the planning costs were obtained via a telephone interview with Mr. Mark Bowman, 
the Waterfront Operations Department’s Business Operations Manager (Code 150A3) at 
SUPSHIP NN.   
CVN 
Planning 
Cost Execution Cost Post Selective Availability Cost  
Total 
68 500,000,000 1,200,000,000 1,950,000,000 3,150,000,000 
69 400,000,000 1,360,000,000 1,820,000,000 3,180,000,000 
70 500,000,000 1,940,000,000 1,180,000,000 3,120,000,000 
Figure 28.   RCOH Planning, Execution, and Post Selective Availability Costs. 
The government spends approximately $4.059 billion to build a new Nimitz-class aircraft 
carrier (Figure 29). Since the average cost of a RCOH is $3.15 billion, the government 
spends approximately 77.6% of what it costs to build a new aircraft carrier to conduct a 
RCOH.  
3.15 0.776 or 77.6%
4.45
3.18 0.783 or 78.3%
4.45






From a consumer’s point of view, this is a highly unfavorable transaction. For example, if 
an automobile is purchased for $20,000 and will last for 200,000 miles, few consumers 
would pay up to 30% of the vehicles purchase price for a 100,000-mile service check. 
However, almost no consumer would be willing to pay $14,000 (70%) for a mid-life 
maintenance service without strongly considering replacing the automobile. Applying the 
same logic to aircraft carriers, the following calculations were conducted.  
The total cost of ownership or lifecycle cost of a nuclear-powered aircraft 





Figure 29.   The total cost of ownership or lifecycle cost of a nuclear-powered aircraft 
carrier compared to a conventional carrier (From: [39]) 
Using the data from Figure 29, the Navy pays $22.22 billion for a 50-year service life of 
a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. This means it spends $444 million/1 year to maintain 
this capability.  
$22.22 $0.444 $444   




Table 3 shows a model of the 50-year lifecycle cost of an aircraft carrier 
adjusted for inflation at an average annual rate of 2.71% [40] over 100-years. The bold 
numbers reflect the initial costs used to configure the model. They are also the numbers 
used to determine the cumulative and non-cumulative annual costs. For example, in year 
two, the cumulative cost is the summation of the ship acquisition cost over seven years 
and the cumulative cost after the first year (0.58 + 0.58 = 1.16). The green highlighted 
rows represent the beginnings of carrier construction (for simplicity, it was modeled as a 
7-year evenly divided process including commissioning), the blue rows represent RCOHs 
(for simplicity, it was modeled as a 3-year evenly divided process) and the red rows 
represent the end of carrier lifecycles (includes inactivation, disposal, and spent nuclear  
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fuel costs). The model demonstrates that the longer the interval between carrier 
constructions, the greater the acquisition and lifecycle costs due to inflation. For example, 
the cost to build a carrier in 26 years is $7.92 billion whereas building one in 43 years 
costs $12.48 billion.  
 
  Cost Over 50-Years   
Cost/Y
ear       
4.059 Ship Acquisition cost  
One 
time 
cost       
2.382 Midlife modernization cost  
One 
time 
cost       
11.677 Direct operating cost  
0.2335
4 = 11.67/50      
3.205 indirect operating cost  0.0641 = 3.205/50      
0.887 Inactivation/disposal cost  
One 
time 
cost       
0.013 spent nuclear fuel storage cost 
One 
time 
cost       
22.223 TOTAL Lifecycle Cost           
           
Inflation           
































1 4.06 0.58 0.2335 0.0641 0.89 0.01 2.38   4.06 0.58 
2 4.17 0.58 0.2399 0.0658 0.91 0.01 2.45  0.00 1.16 
3 4.28 0.58 0.2464 0.0676 0.94 0.01 2.51  0.00 1.74 
4 4.40 0.58 0.2530 0.0695 0.96 0.01 2.58  0.00 2.32 
5 4.52 0.58 0.2599 0.0713 0.99 0.01 2.65  0.00 2.90 
6 4.64 0.58 0.2669 0.0733 1.01 0.01 2.72  0.00 3.48 
7 4.77 0.58 0.2742 0.0753 1.04 0.02 2.80  0.35 4.06 
8 4.90  0.2816 0. 0773 1.07 0.02 2.87  0.36 4.42 
9 5.03  0.2892 0. 0794 1.10 0.02 2.95  0.37 4.79 
10 5.16  0.2971 0. 0815 1.13 0.02 3.03  0.38 5.17 
11 5.30  0.3051 0. 0838 1.16 0.02 3.11  0.39 5.56 
12 5.45  0.3134 0. 0860 1.19 0.02 3.20  0.40 5.95 
13 5.60  0.3219 0. 0884 1.22 0.02 3.28  0.41 6.36 
14 5.75  0.3306 0. 0907 1.26 0.02 3.37  0.42 6.79 
15 5.90  0.3396 0. 0932 1.29 0.02 3.46  0.43 7.22 
16 6.06  0.3488 0. 0957 1.32 0.02 3.56  0.44 7.66 
17 6.23  0.3582 0. 0983 1.36 0.02 3.65  0.46 8.12 
18 6.40  0.3679 0. 1010 1.40 0.02 3.75  0.47 8.59 
19 6.57  0.3779 0. 1037 1.44 0.02 3.85  0.48 9.07 
20 6.75  0.3882 0. 1065 1.47 0.02 3.96  0.49 9.57 
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21 6.93  0.3987 0. 1094 1.51 0.02 4.07  0.51 10.07 
22 7.12  0.4095 0. 1124 1.56 0.02 4.18  0.52 10.60 
23 7.31  0.4206 0. 1154 1.60 0.02 4.29  0.54 11.13 
24 7.51  0.4320 0. 1186 1.64 0.02 4.41  0.55 11.68 
25 7.71   0.4437 0.1218 1.69 0.02 4.53 1.51 5.09 13.76 
26 7.92  0.4557 0. 1251 1.73 0.03 4.65 1.51 0.58 15.84 
27 8.14  0.4680 0. 1285 1.78 0.03 4.77 1.51 0.60 17.95 
28 8.36  0.4807 0. 1319 1.83 0.03 4.90  0.61 18.56 
29 8.58  0.4938 0. 1355 1.88 0.03 5.04  0.63 19.19 
30 8.82  0.5071 0. 1392 1.93 0.03 5.17  0.65 19.84 
31 9.06  0.5209 0. 1430 1.98 0.03 5.31  0.66 20.50 
32 9.30  0.5350 0. 1468 2.03 0.03 5.46  0.68 21.18 
33 9.55  0.5495 0. 1508 2.09 0.03 5.60  0.70 21.88 
34 9.81  0.5644 0. 1549 2.14 0.03 5.76  0.72 22.60 
35 10.08  0.5797 0. 1591 2.20 0.03 5.91  0.74 23.34 
36 10.35  0.5954 0. 1634 2.26 0.03 6.07  0.76 24.10 
37 10.63  0.6115 0. 1678 2.32 0.03 6.24  0.78 24.88 
38 10.92  0.6281 0. 1724 2.39 0.03 6.41  0.80 25.68 
39 11.22  0.6451 0. 1771 2.45 0.04 6.58  0.82 26.50 
40 11.52  0.6626 0. 1819 2.52 0.04 6.76  0.84 27.35 
41 11.83  0.6806 0. 1868 2.58 0.04 6.94  0.87 28.21 
42 12.15  0.6990 0. 1919 2.65 0.04 7.13  0.89 29.11 
43 12.48 1.78 0.7180 0.1971 2.73 0.04 7.32   13.40 31.80 
44 12.82 1.78 0. 7374 0.2024 2.80 0.04 7.52  0.94 34.53 
45 13.17 1.78 0. 7574 0.2079 2.88 0.04 7.73  0.97 37.27 
46 13.52 1.78 0. 7779 0.2135 2.95 0.04 7.93  0.99 40.05 
47 13.89 1.78 0. 7990 0.2193 3.03 0.04 8.15  1.02 42.85 
48 14.27 1.78 0. 8207 0.2252 3.12 0.05 8.37  1.05 45.68 
49 14.65 1.78 0. 8429 0.2313 3.20 0.05 8.60  1.07 48.54 
50 15.05   0.8657 0.2376 3.29 0.05 8.83   4.44 52.98 
51 15.46  0.8892 0. 2441 3.38 0.05 9.07  1.13 54.11 
52 15.88  0.9133 0. 2507 3.47 0.05 9.32  1.16 55.27 
53 16.31  0.9380 0. 2575 3.56 0.05 9.57  1.20 56.47 
54 16.75  0.9635 0. 2644 3.66 0.05 9.83  1.23 57.70 
55 17.20  0.9896 0. 2716 3.76 0.06 10.09  1.26 58.96 
56 17.67  1.0164 0. 2790 3.86 0.06 10.37  1.30 60.25 
57 18.15  1.0439 0. 2865 3.96 0.06 10.65  1.33 61.58 
58 18.64  1.0722 0. 2943 4.07 0.06 10.94  1.37 62.95 
59 19.15  1.1013 0. 3023 4.18 0.06 11.23  1.40 64.35 
60 19.66  1.1311 0. 3105 4.30 0.06 11.54  1.44 65.80 
61 20.20  1.1618 0. 3189 4.41 0.06 11.85  1.48 67.28 
62 20.74  1.1933 0. 3275 4.53 0.07 12.17  1.52 68.80 
63 21.31  1.2256 0. 3364 4.65 0.07 12.50  1.56 70.36 
64 21.88  1.2588 0. 3455 4.78 0.07 12.84  1.60 71.96 
65 22.48  1.2929 0. 3549 4.91 0.07 13.19  1.65 73.61 
66 23.09  1.3280 0. 3645 5.04 0.07 13.54  1.69 75.30 
67 23.71  1.3640 0. 3744 5.18 0.08 13.91  1.74 77.04 
68 24.35  1.4009 0. 3845 5.32 0.08 14.29  1.79 78.83 
69 25.01  1.4389 0. 3949 5.46 0.08 14.68  1.83 80.66 
 100
70 25.69  1.4779 0. 4056 5.61 0.08 15.07  1.88 82.55 
71 26.39  1.5179 0. 4166 5.77 0.08 15.48  1.93 84.48 
72 27.10  1.5591 0. 4279 5.92 0.09 15.90  1.99 86.47 
73 27.84  1.6013 0. 4395 6.08 0.09 16.33  2.04 88.51 
74 28.59  1.6447 0. 4514 6.25 0.09 16.78  2.10 90.60 
75 29.37   1.6893 0.4637 6.42 0.09 17.23 5.74 19.38 98.50 
76 30.16  1.7351 0. 4762 6.59 0.10 17.70 5.74 2.21 106.45 
77 30.98  1.7821 0. 4891 6.77 0.10 18.18 5.74 2.27 114.47 
78 31.82  1.8304 0. 5024 6.95 0.10 18.67  2.33 116.80 
79 32.68  1.8800 0. 5160 7.14 0.10 19.17  2.40 119.20 
80 33.57  1.9309 0. 5300 7.33 0.11 19.69  2.46 121.66 
81 34.48  1.9833 0. 5443 7.53 0.11 20.23  2.53 124.19 
82 35.41  2.0370 0. 5591 7.74 0.11 20.78  2.60 126.78 
83 36.37  2.0922 0. 5743 7.95 0.12 21.34  2.67 129.45 
84 37.36  2.1489 0. 5898 8.16 0.12 21.92  2.74 132.19 
85 38.37  2.2071 0. 6058 8.38 0.12 22.51  2.81 135.00 
86 39.41  2.2670 0. 6222 8.61 0.13 23.12  2.89 137.89 
87 40.48  2.3284 0. 6391 8.84 0.13 23.75  2.97 140.86 
88 41.58  2.3915 0. 6564 9.08 0.13 24.39  3.05 143.91 
89 42.70  2.4563 0. 6742 9.33 0.14 25.05  3.13 147.04 
90 43.86  2.5229 0. 6925 9.58 0.14 25.73  3.22 150.25 
91 45.05  2.5912 0. 7112 9.84 0.14 26.43  3.30 153.55 
92 46.27  2.6615 0. 7305 10.11 0.15 27.15  3.39 156.95 
93 47.52 6.79 2.7336 0.7503 10.38 0.15 27.88   51.01 167.22 
94 48.81 6.79 2. 8077 0.7706 10.66 0.16 28.64  3.58 177.59 
95 50.13 6.79 2. 8838 0.7915 10.95 0.16 29.41  3.68 188.05 
96 51.49 6.79 2. 9619 0.8130 11.25 0.16 30.21  3.77 198.61 
97 52.89 6.79 3. 0422 0.8350 11.55 0.17 31.03  3.88 209.28 
98 54.32 6.79 3. 1246 0.8576 11.87 0.17 31.87  3.98 220.05 
99 55.79 6.79 3. 2093 0.8809 12.19 0.18 32.73  4.09 230.93 
100 57.30   3.2963 0.9047 12.52 0.18 33.62   16.90 247.83 
Table 3.   50-Year Lifecycle Cost Model 
Color Legend 
Bold Numbers – Base Numbers used for Calculations 
Green Highlight- New Ship Construction 
Blue Highlight- RCOH 




Alternatively, if the service life of a nuclear carrier was reduced to 33 
years with the removal of an RCOH, the lifecycle cost of a carrier would be $14.48 
billion and the Navy would spend approximately $438 million/year to maintain this 
capability. The 33-year lifecycle cost was derived from the following calculations using 
the data from Figure 29. 
 
$4.059  
$11.677 33 $7.70682  
50 
$3.205 33 $2.1153  
50 
Ship Acquistion Cost billion
billionDirect Operating Cost years billion
years




⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
$0.887 33 $0.58542 
50 
$0.013 33 $0.00858 
50 
  $4.059 $7.70682 $2.1153
billionon / Disposal Cost years billion 
years
billionSpent Nuclear FuelStorage Cost years billion 
years
Total Lifecylce Cost
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= + + $0.58542 $0.00858 $  
$14.48 0.438 $438   


















  Cost Over 33-Years   Cost/Year     
4.059 Ship Acquisition cost  One time cost     
0.000 Midlife modernization cost  0     
7.707 Direct operating cost  0.23354 = 7.707/33    
2.115 indirect operating cost  0.0641 = 2.115/33    
0.585 Inactivation/disposal cost  One time cost     
0.009 spent nuclear fuel storage cost One time cost     
14.475 TOTAL Lifecycle Cost   0.29764     
         
Inflation         




























1 4.06 0.58 0.2335 0.0641 0.59 0.01 4.06 0.58 
2 4.17 0.58 0.2399 0.0658 0.60 0.01 0.00 1.16 
3 4.28 0.58 0.2464 0.0676 0.62 0.01 0.00 1.74 
4 4.40 0.58 0.2530 0.0695 0.63 0.01 0.00 2.32 
5 4.52 0.58 0.2599 0.0713 0.65 0.01 0.00 2.90 
6 4.64 0.58 0.2669 0.0733 0.67 0.01 0.00 3.48 
7 4.77 0.58 0.2742 0.0753 0.69 0.01 0.35 4.06 
8 4.89  0.2816 0. 0773 0.71 0.01 0.36 4.42 
9 5.03  0.2892 0. 0794 0.73 0.01 0.37 4.79 
10 5.16  0.2971 0. 0815 0.74 0.01 0.38 5.17 
11 5.30  0.3051 0. 0838 0.76 0.01 0.39 5.55 
12 5.45  0.3134 0. 0860 0.79 0.01 0.40 5.95 
13 5.59  0.3219 0. 0884 0.81 0.01 0.41 6.36 
14 5.75  0.3306 0. 0907 0.83 0.01 0.42 6.79 
15 5.90  0.3396 0. 0932 0.85 0.01 0.43 7.22 
16 6.06  0.3488 0. 0957 0.87 0.01 0.44 7.66 
17 6.23  0.3582 0. 0983 0.90 0.01 0.46 8.12 
18 6.39  0.3679 0. 1010 0.92 0.01 0.47 8.59 
19 6.57  0.3779 0. 1037 0.95 0.01 0.48 9.07 
20 6.75  0.3882 0. 1065 0.97 0.01 0.49 9.56 
21 6.93  0.3987 0. 1094 1.00 0.01 0.51 10.07 
22 7.12  0.4095 0. 1124 1.03 0.02 0.52 10.59 
23 7.31  0.4206 0. 1154 1.05 0.02 0.54 11.13 
24 7.51  0.4320 0. 1186 1.08 0.02 0.55 11.68 
25 7.71  0.4437 0. 1218 1.11 0.02 0.57 12.25 
26 7.92 1.13 0.4557 0.1251 1.14 0.02 9.63 13.96 
27 8.13 1.13 0. 4680 0.1285 1.17 0.02 0.60 15.69 
28 8.36 1.13 0. 4807 0.1319 1.21 0.02 0.61 17.43 
29 8.58 1.13 0. 4938 0.1355 1.24 0.02 0.63 19.19 
30 8.81 1.13 0. 5071 0.1392 1.27 0.02 0.65 20.97 
31 9.05 1.13 0. 5209 0.1430 1.31 0.02 0.66 22.76 
32 9.30 1.13 0. 5350 0.1468 1.34 0.02 0.68 24.58 
33 9.55   0.5495 0.1508 1.38 0.02 2.10 26. 68 
 103
34 9.81  0.5644 0. 1549 1.41 0.02 0.72 27.39 
35 10.08  0.5797 0. 1591 1.45 0.02 0.74 28.13 
36 10.35  0.5954 0. 1634 1.49 0.02 0.76 28.89 
37 10.63  0.6115 0. 1678 1.53 0.02 0.78 29.67 
38 10.92  0.6281 0. 1724 1.57 0.02 0.80 30.47 
39 11.21  0.6451 0. 1771 1.62 0.02 0.82 31.29 
40 11.52  0.6626 0. 1819 1.66 0.02 0.84 32.14 
41 11.83  0.6806 0. 1868 1.71 0.03 0.87 33.01 
42 12.15  0.6990 0. 1919 1.75 0.03 0.89 33.90 
43 12.48  0.7180 0. 1971 1.80 0.03 0.92 34.81 
44 12.82  0.7374 0. 2024 1.85 0.03 0.94 35.75 
45 13.16  0.7574 0. 2079 1.90 0.03 0.97 36.72 
46 13.52  0.7779 0. 2135 1.95 0.03 0.99 37.71 
47 13.89  0.7990 0. 2193 2.00 0.03 1.02 38.73 
48 14.26  0.8207 0. 2252 2.06 0.03 1.05 39.77 
49 14.65  0.8429 0. 2313 2.11 0.03 1.07 40.85 
50 15.05  0.8657 0. 2376 2.17 0.03 1.10 41.95 
51 15.45  0.8892 0. 2441 2.23 0.03 1.13 43.08 
52 15.87  0.9133 0. 2507 2.29 0.03 1.16 44.25 
53 16.30  0.9380 0. 2575 2.35 0.03 1.20 45.44 
54 16.75  0.9635 0. 2644 2.42 0.04 1.23 46.67 
55 17.20  0.9896 0. 2716 2.48 0.04 1.26 47.93 
56 17.67  1.0164 0. 2790 2.55 0.04 1.30 49.23 
57 18.14  1.0439 0. 2865 2.62 0.04 1.33 50.56 
58 18.64  1.0722 0. 2943 2.69 0.04 1.37 51.92 
59 19.14 2.73 1.1013 0.3023 2.76 0.04 23.28 56.06 
60 19.66 2.73 1. 1311 0.3105 2.84 0.04 1.44 60.24 
61 20.19 2.73 1. 1618 0.3189 2.91 0.04 1.48 64.45 
62 20.74 2.73 1. 1933 0.3275 2.99 0.04 1.52 68.71 
63 21.30 2.73 1. 2256 0.3364 3.07 0.05 1.56 73.01 
64 21.88 2.73 1. 2588 0.3455 3.16 0.05 1.60 77.34 
65 22.47 2.73 1. 2929 0.3549 3.24 0.05 1.65 81.73 
66 23.08   1.3280 0.3645 3.33 0.05 5.07 86. 80 
67 23.71  1.3640 0. 3744 3.42 0.05 1.74 88.53 
68 24.35  1.4009 0. 3845 3.51 0.05 1.79 90.32 
69 25.01  1.4389 0. 3949 3.61 0.05 1.83 92.15 
70 25.69  1.4779 0. 4056 3.70 0.05 1.88 94.04 
71 26.38  1.5179 0. 4166 3.81 0.06 1.93 95.97 
72 27.10  1.5591 0. 4279 3.91 0.06 1.99 97.96 
73 27.83  1.6013 0. 4395 4.01 0.06 2.04 100.00 
74 28.59  1.6447 0. 4514 4.12 0.06 2.10 102.10 
75 29.36  1.6893 0. 4637 4.23 0.06 2.15 104.25 
76 30.16  1.7351 0. 4762 4.35 0.06 2.21 106.46 
77 30.97  1.7821 0. 4891 4.47 0.07 2.27 108.73 
78 31.81  1.8304 0. 5024 4.59 0.07 2.33 111.06 
79 32.67  1.8800 0. 5160 4.71 0.07 2.40 113.46 
80 33.56  1.9309 0. 5300 4.84 0.07 2.46 115.92 
81 34.47  1.9833 0. 5443 4.97 0.07 2.53 118.45 
82 35.40  2.0370 0. 5591 5.11 0.07 2.60 121.04 
 104
83 36.36  2.0922 0. 5743 5.24 0.08 2.67 123.71 
84 37.35  2.1489 0. 5898 5.39 0.08 2.74 126.45 
85 38.36  2.2071 0. 6058 5.53 0.08 2.81 129.26 
86 39.40  2.2670 0. 6222 5.68 0.08 2.89 132.15 
87 40.47  2.3284 0. 6391 5.84 0.09 2.97 135.12 
88 41.56  2.3915 0. 6564 5.99 0.09 3.05 138.17 
89 42.69  2.4563 0. 6742 6.16 0.09 3.13 141.30 
90 43.85  2.5229 0. 6925 6.32 0.09 3.22 144.51 
91 45.04  2.5912 0. 7112 6.50 0.10 3.30 147.82 
92 46.26 6.61 2.6615 0.7305 6.67 0.10 56.26 157.82 
93 47.51 6.61 2. 7336 0.7503 6.85 0.10 3.48 167.91 
94 48.80 6.61 2. 8077 0.7706 7.04 0.10 3.58 178.09 
95 50.12 6.61 2. 8838 0.7915 7.23 0.11 3.68 188.38 
96 51.48 6.61 2. 9619 0.8130 7.42 0.11 3.77 198.76 
97 52.87 6.61 3. 0422 0.8350 7.63 0.11 3.88 209.25 
98 54.31 6.61 3. 1246 0.8576 7.83 0.11 3.98 219.84 
99 55.78   3.2093 0.8809 8.04 0.12 12.25 232. 09 
100 57.29   3.2963 0. 9047 8.26 0.12 4.20 236.29 
Table 4.   33-Year Lifecycle Cost Model. 
Color Legend 
Bold Numbers – Base Numbers used for calculations 
Green Highlight- New Ship Construction 
Red Highlight – Ship Disposal 
Table 4 shows a model of the 33-year lifecycle cost of an aircraft carrier 
adjusted for inflation at an average annual rate of 2.71% [39] over 100 years. The bold 
numbers reflect the initial costs used to configure the model. They are also the numbers 
used to determine the cumulative and non-cumulative annual costs. For example, the cost 
to build a carrier in 26 years is the summation of the cumulative annual cost of a carrier at 
25 years, the ship acquisition cost over seven years, the direct cost at 26 years and the 
indirect operations costs at 26 years (12.25 + 1.13 + 0.4557 + 0.1251 = $13.96 billion). 
The green highlighted rows represent the beginnings of carrier, construction (for 
simplicity, it was modeled as a 7year evenly divided process including commissioning) 
and the red rows represent the end of carrier lifecycles (includes inactivation, disposal, 
and spent nuclear fuel costs).  
 
 105
Table 5 is a cumulative cost comparison of the two-lifecycle approaches. 
It shows that although their costs are similar at 100 years (Figure 30), the 33-Year 
Lifecycle Philosophy (33LCP) is overall more cost effective than the 50-Year Lifecycle 
Philosophy (50LCP) because the Navy receives more performance for equal to or less 
cost. For example, in respect to performance, according to the 33LCP the Navy would 
receive three modernized Nimitz-class aircraft carriers over 100 years as opposed to two. 
Each carrier would be able to achieve greater performance (work accomplished) due to 
the elimination of the three to four year lay-up period (RCOH). This means that some of 
the strain to the fleet (i.e., equipment, personnel, and ship maintenance) from extended 
deployments would no longer be the result of RCOH delivery delays. In addition, the 
combatant commanders would benefit from the carriers increased operational availability 
as deployable assets, which would enhance their (CCDRs) ability to utilize those assets. 
From a cost perspective, the second ship constructed in the 33LCP ($7.92 billion) is 
$4.56 billion less expensive than the second ship of the 50LCP ($12.48 billion). The total 
cost of ownership (TCOO) of the 33LCP over 100 years is $53.32 billion less expensive 
than the 50LCP over 100 years.  Additionally, the average cost per year for the 33LCP 























1 4.06 0.58 0.58 65.18 65.72 
2 4.17 1.16 1.16   
3 4.28 1.74 1.74   
4 4.40 2.32 2.32   
5 4.52 2.90 2.90   
6 4.64 3.48 3.48   
7 4.77 4.06 4.06   
8 4.90 4.42 4.42   
9 5.03 4.79 4.79   
10 5.16 5.17 5.17   
11 5.30 5.55 5.56   
12 5.45 5.95 5.95   
13 5.60 6.36 6.36   
14 5.75 6.79 6.79   
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15 5.90 7.22 7.22   
16 6.06 7.66 7.66   
17 6.23 8.12 8.12   
18 6.40 8.59 8.59   
19 6.57 9.07 9.07   
20 6.75 9.56 9.57   
21 6.93 10.07 10.07   
22 7.12 10.59 10.60   
23 7.31 11.13 11.13   
24 7.51 11.68 11.68   
25 7.71 12.25 13.76   
26 7.92 13.96 15.84   
27 8.14 15.69 17.95   
28 8.36 17.43 18.56   
29 8.58 19.19 19.19   
30 8.82 20.97 19.84   
31 9.06 22.76 20.50   
32 9.30 24.58 21.18   
33 9.55 26.68 21.88   
34 9.81 27.39 22.60   
35 10.08 28.13 23.34   
36 10.35 28.89 24.10   
37 10.63 29.67 24.88   
38 10.92 30.47 25.68   
39 11.22 31.29 26.50   
40 11.52 32.14 27.35   
41 11.83 33.01 28.21   
42 12.15 33.90 29.11   
43 12.48 34.81 31.80   
44 12.82 35.75 34.53   
45 13.17 36.72 37.27   
46 13.52 37.71 40.05   
47 13.89 38.73 42.85   
48 14.27 39.77 45.68   
49 14.65 40.85 48.54   
50 15.05 41.95 52.98   
51 15.46 43.08 54.11   
52 15.88 44.25 55.27   
53 16.31 45.44 56.47   
54 16.75 46.67 57.70   
55 17.20 47.93 58.96   
56 17.67 49.23 60.25   
57 18.15 50.56 61.58   
58 18.64 51.92 62.95   
59 19.15 56.06 64.35   
60 19.66 60.24 65.80   
61 20.20 64.45 67.28   
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62 20.74 68.71 68.80   
63 21.31 73.01 70.36   
64 21.88 77.34 71.96   
65 22.48 81.73 73.61   
66 23.09 86.80 75.30   
67 23.71 88.53 77.04   
68 24.35 90.32 78.83   
69 25.01 92.15 80.66   
70 25.69 94.04 82.55   
71 26.39 95.97 84.48   
72 27.10 97.96 86.47   
73 27.84 100.00 88.51   
74 28.59 102.10 90.60   
75 29.37 104.25 98.50   
76 30.16 106.46 106.45   
77 30.98 108.73 114.47   
78 31.82 111.06 116.80   
79 32.68 113.46 119.20   
80 33.57 115.92 121.66   
81 34.48 118.45 124.19   
82 35.41 121.04 126.78   
83 36.37 123.71 129.45   
84 37.36 126.45 132.19   
85 38.37 129.26 135.00   
86 39.41 132.15 137.89   
87 40.48 135.12 140.86   
88 41.58 138.17 143.91   
89 42.70 141.30 147.04   
90 43.86 144.51 150.25   
91 45.05 147.82 153.55   
92 46.27 157.82 156.95   
93 47.52 167.91 167.22   
94 48.81 178.09 177.59   
95 50.13 188.38 188.05   
96 51.49 198.76 198.61   
97 52.89 209.25 209.28   
98 54.32 219.84 220.05   
99 55.79 232.09 230.93   
100 57.30 236.29 247.83   
Total Cost 
Of 
Ownership   6518.44 6571.75   
 




Green Highlight- New Ship Construction 
Blue Highlight- RCOH 
Red Highlight – Ship Disposal 
 




















Figure 30.   50 vs. 33 Year Lifecycle  
The 33LCP is the best of solutions proposed by this research to answer the 
thesis question because it meets the criteria for cost and time effectiveness defined by this 
study. According to Chapter I, effC  was any change in planning, scheduling, and/or 
conducting an RCOH that resulted in less cost for the more performance (work 
accomplished) or less cost for the same amount of performance. 33LCP meets these 
criterions. As stated previously, under the 33LCP, the Navy would procure three brand 
new carriers as opposed to one under the 50LCP. This increases the ship’s level 
modernization and reduces the maintenance costs due to aging equipment. With the 
elimination of an RCOH,  
effT  is one. effT  of one increases the operational availability of aircraft 
carriers since there is no longer a 4-year mean down time with the potential for further 
delays. Also, since NGC has built all of the Nimitz-class carriers for the Navy (Chapter 
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V, Section B), the learning curve and cost associated with constructing those type of 
vessels has been realized whereas the learning curve and cost associated with RCOHs 
remains fairly uncertain. Further studies on the relationship between cost, maintenance, 
operational availability, and risks associated with eliminating an RCOH from a carrier’s 
lifecycle are warranted and beyond the scope of this research. However, with that said, it 
is the author’s opinion that the 33-year lifecycle philosophy is the best of the solutions 
offered within the scope of this thesis to stem the Navy’s challenge of confronting the 
increasing costs and schedule durations associated with refueling and complex overhauls. 
E.  FUTURE WORK 
This section contains brief questions on areas for future research noted in the 
course of writing this thesis. 
• What types of non-nuclear maintenance can be conducted pier side or 
through underwater husbandry? Additionally, what types of work can be 
done outside of dry-dock and what are the implications of doing work 
inside and outside of dry-dock? 
• What is the impact to a carrier’s operational availability (i.e., crew training 
and operational readiness) associated with decreasing a RCOH’s duration? 
• What are the relationships between time in dry-dock and maintenance 
concepts? 
• When is the most opportune time to improve upon a carrier’s capabilities? 
When does cost the least to do and where should it should it be done? 
• What is the impact to an aircraft carrier’s operational readiness associated 
with removing combat system upgrades from a RCOHs work package? 
• By deferring modernization efforts to planned incremental availabilities, 
what is the impact to the overall aircraft carriers maintenance cycle?  
• By reducing the number of aircraft carries in the Navy, what are the 
impacts to national security, manning, and cost? 
F. CHAPTE R SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the conclusions and future work generated from 
completing this thesis. 
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